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A LIFE FREE FROM FEAR 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME IN IRELAND: 
AN NGO PERSPECTIVE
The aim of this Report is to progress the discussion of and 
generate an impetus for, legislative change in the area 
of hate crime in Ireland.
This Report and its conclusions are informed by primary 
research with non-governmental organisations engaged in 
supporting communities which are targets of hate crime; 
as well as a systematic review of international literature 
regarding legislative options for tackling hate crime.
The research findings highlight the inadequacy of Irish 
legislation with regard to combating hate crime. 
The authors understand hate crimes as a source of significant 
harm for victims, their communities and the social fabric of 
the nation. They highlight international expert opinion that 
the issue of hate crime is becoming ever more salient, and 
that periods of economic recession offer particularly fertile 
ground for this type of offence. 
In addition to presenting the experiences and perspectives 
of NGOs who deal on a regular basis with the challenge 
of hate crime, this Report provides an analysis of the 
efficacy of Irish legislation in combating hate crime. 
It explores a range of legislative options drawing upon 
international experiences. 
The findings highlight the need to achieve a balance 
between the expansiveness of protections and legal precision; 
between inclusivity and clarity. The authors highlight the 
difficulties integral to achieving a balance between rights 
and freedoms. It also acknowledges the possibility of creating 
a hierarchy of victims among those seeking protection.
In presenting various legislative options, the authors examine 
the potential of introducing aggravated offences and 
sentence enhancement, as well as determining the victim 
groups that should be protected. 
The Report concludes by presenting a proposal for legislative 
change which it is hoped will promote widespread debate 
and an awareness of the impetus for change. This proposal 
is based on what the authors believe to be best international 
practice, and provides suggestions for evidence-based 
reform reflecting the submissions of NGOs.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In addition to amendments to the Prohibition of Incitement to 
Hatred Act 1989, the Report proposes:
 The creation of four new hostility based offences: assault  
 aggravated by hostility; criminal damage aggravated by  
 hostility; harassment aggravated by hostility; and public  
 order aggravated by hostility; the ‘aggravated’ element of  
 the offences being fulfilled where the offence is believed  
 by the trier of fact to be wholly or partly motivated by 
 hostility, prejudice, bias or hatred towards the victim on the  
 basis of personal characteristics or perceived characteristics.  
 In the context of sexual offences against individuals with  
 disabilities, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993  
 should be appropriately amended.
 A sentence enhancement provision be introduced, such  
 that where the court believes that any offence was  
 wholly or partly motivated by hostility, prejudice bias  
 or hatred, or where hostility, prejudice bias or hatred  
 was demonstrated during the course of the offence, it  
 shall treat that as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  
 Additionally, it is suggested that a provision be 
 introduced which provides that where a prosecution 
 is taken which includes a prosecution under section 2 of  
 the 1989 Act, the sentence imposed under the 1989 Act  
 must  be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for  
 the primary offence. 
 The protected categories, or ‘personal characteristics’  
 should reflect, but not be confined by, those protected  
 characteristics in Equality legislation, and be defined as  
 ‘Gender, Civil status, Family status, Age, Race, Religion,  
 Disability, Sexual orientation, Membership of the 
 Traveller Community or any other similar factor.’ 
 The authors envisage that trans persons would be 
 protected under the proposed wording, but also advocate  
 the legal recognition of trans persons’ affirmed gender.
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Sound public policy must always be grounded in a careful assessment that considers best practices in the appropriate context. 
Jennifer Schweppe, Amanda Haynes, and James Carr have here laid such foundations for Ireland’s attempts to grapple with 
hate crime. This is a balanced and persuasive call for the country to introduce a legal framework that will bring it into line with 
international standards.
The absence of hate crime legislation in Ireland is a glaring anomaly in the European context, and indeed, across the West. 
Without it, Ireland stands virtually alone in its silence with respect to protecting vulnerable communities form the harms of this 
particular form of violence.
This sentiment is echoed by the voices shared in this Report. Those in the best position to know – representatives from NGOs that 
support affected communities – expressed grave concerns about the risks of violence against targeted groups and individuals. 
Failure to embed protections against this violence lends what I have referred to as ‘permission to hate.’ It signals the marginality 
of those most vulnerable to hate crime.
The Report is not simply a one-sided call for a particular legislative direction – although one is favoured. It is a carefully 
weighted assessment of the many permutations of motivations, offences, victims, and enforcement mechanisms. Drawing on 
current practice elsewhere, it lays out the distinct implications of these disparate types of legislation. In the final analysis, the 
existence of legislation is as important as the nature of that statutory response. This is a document around which communities 
can and should rally to ensure their future security.
Professor Barbara Perry,
Associate Dean, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities,
University of Ontario Institute of Technology
January 2014
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Summary of methodology 
This Report is informed by empirical research with non-
governmental organisations engaged in supporting 
communities which are targets of hate crime, and a 
systematic review of international literature regarding 
legislative options for tackling hate crime.
Empirical data was gathered via an online survey 
distributed to 14 NGOs who responded to a call for 
participants. Survey questions addressed the organisations’ 
remit and client base, their experiences of supporting clients 
who have been subject to hate crime, and their perspectives 
on the adequacy of current hate crime legislation in Ireland. 
Questions were primarily open-ended and the resultant 
qualitative data were subject to thematic analysis. Participants 
were recruited through the purposive sampling of NGOs 
known to advocate for and support communities and 
individuals covered under the 9 grounds of Irish equality 
legislation,3 and by advertising widely for volunteers 
through distribution of an open call for participants via 
websites and email distribution lists of relevance to NGOs.
The introduction to the online survey defined hate crime for 
participants as:  
In chapter 4, we acknowledge the difficulties with the term 
‘hate’ and ‘hate crime’, but choose to employ these terms 
in this Report, as those through which the current debate 
is most commonly framed. For the purposes of identifying 
an operational definition of relevance to the Irish context, 
we have employed the grounds named in Ireland’s equality 
Rationale for the research
Legislating for hate crimes in Ireland is no longer optional 
for the Government but a necessity, in the opinion of the 
authors. The absence of hate crimes legislation from our 
statute books is glaring, and pressure is coming from both 
internal and external sources to rectify this situation. From 
an internal perspective, NGOs, academics and, increasingly, 
politicians vocalise the needs of affected communities.  
Externally, international organisations, most recently the 
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance1  
continue to highlight and criticise the lacuna in Irish law 
on this issue. The passing of the EU Directive establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime has made this issue mandatory rather than 
optional. 
That said, hate crime legislation cannot be introduced in a 
vacuum, with an expectation that the criminal law will be 
a panacea to this pervasive social problem. Similarly, it 
cannot be introduced with reference to a limited range of 
victim groups, or community interests. This research examines 
the experiences of NGOs across a number of community and 
voluntary organisations working with victims of hate crime, and 
probes their ideas regarding the need for legislative change. 
We argue that, by legislating for change on the basis of 
actual community needs, rather than perceptions of those 
needs, and by carefully examining the experience of other 
jurisdictions of hate crime, any resulting legislation will not 
only be in line with best international practice but will also 
provide what is best for our country and for victims of hate 
crimes in this jurisdiction. 
Context of the research
The purpose of this research is not to evaluate existing 
legislation prohibiting what we refer to as the ‘expression 
offences’ the adequacy and efficacy of which have been 
examined elsewhere.2 We note the context of the Act, and 
its advantages and limitations, but focus more broadly on 
the need for hate crimes legislation: that is, where an 
offence known to the criminal law, such as assault, is 
committed with a hate motivation or where hate or hostility 
are demonstrated during the course of an offence.
 … any criminal offence which is perceived, 
by the victim or any other person, to be 
motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on 
a person’s real or perceived: race,4  religion, 
gender identity,5  sexual orientation, age, 
marital status, family status, membership of 
the Traveller Community, disability.6
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legislation. In chapter 5, however, we acknowledge that 
intensive discussion and consultation is required if groups 
are to be named in any emergent hate crime legislation 
and, indeed, the pitfalls associated with naming specific 
identity groups in general. 
In responding to survey questions participants, in 
addition to addressing crimes which would amount to 
criminal offences under the definition provided, have chosen 
to introduce experiences of and perspectives on non-crime 
hate incidents. It is our contention that the salience of these 
non-crime expressions of hate to NGOs and their clients 
speaks to the existence of a continuum of criminalised and 
non-criminalised hate incidents both of which contribute 
to the exclusion of marginalised communities.  In this we 
concur with Perry, who asserts that non-crime hate incidents 
have a very malign impact on both victims and society, with 
victims relating that ‘… by their very frequency and ubiquity, 
some of the most minor types of victimisation – name calling, 
verbal harassment, and so on – had the most damaging 
effects’.7 For those who are targeted, as stated clearly by 
the England and Wales Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO), non-crime ‘[h]ate Incidents can feel like crimes’ 
and need official recognition if they are to be challenged.8 
As ACPO observes, we need to both recognise and record 
hate incidents to not only acknowledge their impact, but 
also to prevent an escalation of hate incidents into hate 
crimes. Equally, this broad interpretation of the focus of this 
study speaks to the need to continuously review the range of 
acts which are defined as offences under the law and also to 
record non-crime hate incidents with a view to addressing them 
and their impacts through interventions available outside of 
the criminal justice system. 
1 
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI Report on Ireland: fourth  
 monitoring cycle (ECRI 2013) available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/ 
 Country-by-country/Ireland/IRL-CbC-IV-2013-001-ENG.pdf
2 
Jennifer Schweppe and Dermot Walsh, Combating Racism and Xenophobia through the  
 Criminal Law (NCCRI 2008).
3 
The nine protected grounds under Equality legislation are gender, civil status, family  
 status, age, race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and membership of the Traveller  
 community.
4 
The authors wish to make a clear statement that they regard race as a social construct  
 and do not regard the use of the term as unproblematic. 
5 
The authors further note that an inclusive understanding of ‘gender’ is intended. The  
 authors support the legal recognition of trans persons’ affirmed gender.
6 
This definition is derived from that employed in England and Wales. See  
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/  
 file/266358/hate-crime-2013.pdf  Home Office, Office for National Statistics and  
 Ministry of Justice, An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (2013), 11.
7 
Barbara Perry, ‘There’s just places ya’ don’t wanna go”: the segregating impact of hate  
 crime against Native Americans’ (2009) 12(4) Contemporary Justice Review 401, 402.
8 
Association of Chief Police Officers, Truevision: ‘What is Hate Crime?’ (ACPO 2013)  
 available at http://Report-it.org.uk/what_is_hate_crime 
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History and development of hate crimes 
legislation internationally 
There are some crimes which have been known for 
centuries: murder and theft, for example, are crimes as old 
as the legal systems which enforce them and are so well 
established that to question their existence seems almost 
ludicrous. Other offences are more modern, reflecting 
changes such as adaptations in societal views as to what is 
acceptable, or developments in technology - the notion of 
cybercrimes, for example, even as recently as the 1980s, 
would have been alien to most.
Hate crimes have a more modern pedigree, and come in 
two forms. The first, the ‘expression offences’, are those 
crimes where the use of threatening, abusive or insulting 
speech is criminalised - though of course it is not simply 
the use of such speech which renders the speech criminal: 
it must also be intended or, having regard to all the 
circumstances, likely, to stir up hatred.9 The second type of 
hate crime are those whereby an offence known to the 
criminal law is committed with a hateful prejudiced, bigoted 
or hostile motivation towards the victim, and where this 
motivation is clear, based on the language or actions used by 
the offender during the course of the offence taking place.10
What we call in this Report the ‘expression offences’ have 
a relatively modern pedigree, at least from a European 
perspective. While in the United States, attempts at 
prohibiting hate speech are met with the barrier of the First 
Amendment, in England and Wales, hate speech was first 
prohibited by the Race Relations Act 1965.11  Section 6 of 
the Act made it an offence to incite racial hatred.  However, 
under the section, it was necessary to prove intent to stir up 
hatred, and due to difficulties with its operation it was 
ultimately amended in the Public Order Act 1986.12 This 
created new offences consisting of certain forms of behaviour 
which were intended to stir up racial hatred. For the most 
part they concern the display or publication of racially 
offensive material. 
In Ireland, ‘expression offences’ are prohibited by the 
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989,13 but this 
Report focuses on a different type of hate crime which is a 
more recent phenomenon. While it was at least implicitly 
accepted that individuals have always committed crimes 
out of prejudice or hatred, it is only since the 1990s that 
legislators worldwide have chosen to treat this type of crime 
any differently. First in the United States and more latterly 
in Canada and the United Kingdom, legislation has been 
introduced which punishes regular crimes (such as assault 
or criminal damage) which are committed with a ‘hate’ 
motivation differently. The introduction of such laws is not easy 
or without controversy. The reason that the introduction of such 
crimes is considered contentious is because the criminal law 
does not usually concern itself with the motivation of the 
offender. If a person robs food from a shop because their 
family is starving, and another robs food from the same shop 
to sell it to feed their heroin habit, they will both be convicted 
for the same offence. The reason for this is because the 
motivation of the offender is generally considered irrelevant to 
the law itself – although of course, when the judge sentences 
the two individuals, she will usually take the motivation of 
the offender into account (which means that in the example 
above, the first offender would probably get a lighter 
sentence than the second). Hate crimes, however, make the 
motivation of the offender part of the offence. This is why 
they are seen differently and treated differently to other 
types of offence, and why it is perhaps considered more 
contentious to introduce them.
The other reason why hate crime offences can be a source 
of dispute is that they generally protect specific victim 
groups to the exclusion of other individuals and groups 
who might also be the victims of hate crime.
 
Adequacy of the term
The term hate crime is used extensively by academics, 
in literature, by the media, by community groups and by 
victims themselves. We too use it in this Report as it is an 
established label within public discourse. However, when 
we look at what the constituent elements of a hate crime 
are, we quickly realise that few hate crimes are actually 
defined in terms of punishing hatred of a victim or their 
community. 
Hate crime legislation has been introduced in 
a great many countries, and now it seems 
timely, if not overdue, that we ask whether 
we should introduce such crimes in Ireland. 
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The reason for this is, quite simply, that ‘hate’, as an 
emotion, is more difficult to define, while bias, prejudice, 
hostility and bigotry are easier to delimit. For example, 
prejudice was defined by Allport as ‘an aversive or 
hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, 
simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore 
presumed to have objectionable qualities ascribed to the 
group’.14 Concepts such as bias and bigotry can be similarly 
defined. 
As a means of surmounting the problems posed by the 
ambiguity of the term ‘hate’, hate crime itself is mostly 
commonly defined by reference to the groups targeted. 
Royzman et al refer to a common definition of hate crimes: 
‘Criminal actions intended to harm or intimidate people 
because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, 
or other minority status’,15 and give a definition of hate, 
which avoids characterising the nature of hate in favour 
of focusing on the status of the victimised community:  
‘[H]ate means roughly that which motivates a deliberate act 
of physical violence or intimidation against a member of a 
minority group by virtue of him or her being a member of 
that group. In this view, classifying a criminal deed as one 
of ‘hate’ is compatible with a wide range of psychological 
states, anything from anger to boredom to fear ….’ 16
Royzman et al argue that the significance of retaining the 
label of hate crime, despite its shortfalls, lies not in its 
description of the emotion or context of the crime; but 
instead, in that by using the term, we as a community 
are distancing ourselves from the viewpoints of the 
perpetrators of the attack. Hate here is not necessarily 
referring to any psychological definition of the term, but 
rather what is called the ‘othering’ involved in the crime. 
While the term ‘prejudice’ is probably more appropriate 
for what is being punished here, when we refer to hate 
crime, what is critical is that the prejudice is linked to the 
status of the victim, and the crime was committed against 
that victim because of their identification with a particular 
community or minority group. 
Significance and meaning to affected individuals, 
communities and society
While generally speaking, crimes are ranked in severity 
by assessing the objective gravity of the resulting harm, 
the impact on the victim and the societal harm of the offence 
(assault, assault causing harm, assault causing serious 
harm17), hate crimes are punished more harshly due to the 
prejudice of the offender, and the additional impact of the 
crime on the victim and the particular community with which 
the victim identifies. Quill observes that the term ‘hate crime’ is:
… meant to distinguish criminal conduct motivated by 
prejudices from criminal conduct motivated by lust, jealousy, 
greed, politics, and so forth. Unlike theft, burglary, or assault, 
hate crime emphasizes the offender’s attitudes, values, and 
character.18
In the context of the English legislation criminalising racism, 
Baroness Hale eloquently stated:
The mischiefs attacked by the aggravated versions of these 
offences are racism and xenophobia. Their essence is the 
denial of equal respect and dignity to people who are seen 
as somehow other. This is more deeply hurtful, damaging and 
disrespectful to the victims than the simple version of these 
offences. It is also more damaging to the community as a 
whole, by denying acceptance to members of certain groups 
not for their own sake but for the sake of something they can 
do nothing about.19
With regard to the impact of hate crime on the individual, 
empirical research has demonstrated that such offences 
have even more grave emotional and psychological 
effects on victims than non-bias offences.20 For example, the 
20011/12 and 2012/13 Crime Surveys for England and 
Wales recorded that victims of hate crime are  more than 
twice as likely to report fear, sleep disturbances, anxiety 
or panic attacks, feelings of vulnerability or loss of 
confidence, as victims of crime in general.21 Hate crime 
Hate crimes legislation generally involves the 
punishment of bias, prejudice, malice, hostility 
or bigotry.
Wherever the terms ‘hate’ or ‘hate crime’ are 
used in this Report, we intend them to be used 
in this broad context, to connote prejudice, 
bias, hostility and bigotry, or crimes committed 
with such motivation. 
09
A LIFE FREE FROM FEAR 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME IN IRELAND: 
AN NGO PERSPECTIVE
victims may fear repeat offences where they were targeted 
because of difference which they cannot disguise and may 
equally suffer where their victimisation causes them to hide a 
characteristic which is fundamental to their selfhood:
…somebody who is not really comfortable with their 
sexuality and who is attacked because of that, it completely 
shatters them, and often times sends them back into the 
closet, and that kind of leads to more psychological effects.22
The direct victim may be impacted also, not only by the act 
itself, but by the prejudice which informs it. Hate crimes 
communicate to victims the perpetrator’s sense of the victim’s 
fundamental otherness and their inferiority; exposure to such 
may impact upon an individual’s sense of their status in 
society and, in some cases, their sense of self.23
Perry and Alvi24 have recently documented the in terrorem 
effects of hate crime. They find that members of a targeted 
identity group report many of the effects cited by direct 
victims, including feelings of fear, vulnerability and 
inferiority, and alter their behaviour in response to the 
crime. Noelle25 concurs that distal victims may themselves 
experience the same kinds of effects as the direct victim, 
drawing on a case study of the impact of Mathew Shepard’s 
murder in a homophobic attack:
‘… many participants evidenced clear shifts in their 
assumptions of benevolence of the world and of people. … 
shock and denial reflected difficulty assimilating this event 
into fundamental assumptions. … steps participants took to 
rebuild their assumptive worlds [included changing] …
what they wore or their mannerisms … [a minority 
experienced] changes in self-worth, including internalized 
homophobia…’ 26
Perry regards hate crime as constituent of social relations of 
domination and subordination, seeing it as:
… a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to 
reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a given 
social order. It is a means of marking both the Self and the 
Other in such a way as to re-establish their ‘proper’ relative 
positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies 
and patterns of social and political inequality.27
Given the manner in which hate crime can impact inter-group 
relations, its repercussions are held to extend far beyond the 
direct victim and indeed beyond the immediate time period 
following the incident.  
‘Already a manifestation of divisions within society, it is 
argued that hate crime further exacerbates tensions,
threatening the social fabric.’ 28
Hate crime is understood as a ‘message crime’, 
that is, its function is to send a message, not 
only to the direct victim, but also to the group, 
on the basis of whose membership they were 
targeted. As such, hate crime has multiple 
indirect victims, in addition to those directly 
victimised.
10
9 
See, section 2 of Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989.
10 
Similarly, where prejudice, hostility or bigotry are demonstrated during the course of  
 the offence, this is considered to elevate the offence to a hate crime in certain 
 jurisdictions.
11 
However, as noted by the NCCRI Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989: 
 A Review (NCCRI 2001) available at 
 http://www.nccri.iesubmissions/01AugLegislation.pdf one of the earliest recorded  
 cases concerning incitement to hatred took place in 1732 in the case of R v Osborne
 (1732) 2 Swnast 503 where newspaper material was ruled to be seditious for 
 allegations against Portuguese Jews that led to violence and disorder.
12 
Section 6 was replaced by section 70 of the Race Relations Act 1976 which inserted a  
 new section 5A into the Public Order Act 1936 which itself was replaced by Part III of  
 the Public Order Act 1986.. 
13 
For a detailed analysis of the content and scope of the 1989 Act, see Jennifer  
 Schweppe and Dermot Walsh, Combating Racism and Xenophobia through the 
 Criminal Law (NCCRI 2008) chapter 3.
14 
Gordon W Allport The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge 1954) 7.
15 
Edward B Royzman, Clark McCauley and Paul Rozin, ‘From Plato to Putnam: 
 Four Ways to Think about Hate’ in Robert Sternberg (ed), The Psychology of Hate  
 (American Psychological Assocation 2005) 3, 9
16 
Edward B Royzman, Clark McCauley and Paul Rozin, ‘From Plato to Putnam: 
 Four Ways to Think about Hate’ in Robert Sternberg (ed), The Psychology of Hate  
 (American Psychological Assocation 2005) 9-10.
17 
Sections 2-4 Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.
18 
G F Quill, ‘Motivation, Causation and Hate Crimes Sentence Enhancement: 
 A Cautious Approach to Mind Reading and Incarceration’ (2010) 58 Drake Law  
 Review 181, 188.
19 
R v Rogers [2007] UKHL 8; [2007] 2 AC 62 at [12]-[13]. 
20 
See for example Paul Iganski, ‘Hate Crime Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American 
 Behavioural Scientist, 626; Paul Iganski, Hate Crime and the City (Policy Press 2008);  
 Jack McDevitt, Jennifer Balboni, Luis Garcia and Joann Gu, ‘Consequences for victims:  
 A comparison of bias- and non-bias motivated assaults’ (2001) 45 American 
 Behavioural Scientist 697; Gregory M Herek, J Roy Gillis and Jeanine C Cogan, 
 ‘Psychological sequelae of hate crime victimization among lesbian, gay and bisexual  
 adults’ (1999) 67 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 945.
21 
Home Office, Ministry for Justice and Office for National Statistics, An Overview of  
 Hate Crime in England and Wales (2013).
22 
Research participant cited in Paul Iganski, ‘Hate Crime Hurt More’ (2001) 45 
 American Behavioural Scientist 626, 629.
23 
Paul Iganski, ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American Behavioural Scientist 626.
24 
Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi, ‘’We are all vulnerable’: the in terrorem effects of hate  
 crimes’ (2012) 18 International Review of Victimology 57.
25 
Monique Noelle ‘The ripple effect of the Matthew Shepard murder: impact on the  
 assumptive worlds of members of the targeted group’ (2002) 46 American Behavioral  
 Scientist 27.
26 
Ibid 45-46.
27 
Barbara Perry, ‘“There’s just places ya’ don’t wanna go”: the segregating impact of  
 hate crime against Native Americans’ (2009) 12(4) Contemporary Justice Review 401,  
 403.
28 
Paul Iganski, ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 American Behavioural Scientist, 626,  
 630-632; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Hate Crime Laws: A  
 Practical Guide (ODIHR 2009).
11
A LIFE FREE FROM FEAR 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME IN IRELAND: 
AN NGO PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER 3 
HATE CRIMES IN AN IRISH CONTEXT 
12
incites hatred in others. However, this balance is cold comfort 
to those hundreds of individuals in Ireland who suffer daily 
and ritual verbal abuse because of their personal character-
istics and for whom this Act is ineffective. While the scope 
of the legislation cannot be broadened in a manner which 
criminalises all forms of abusive speech, we would reiterate 
the recommendations of Schweppe and Walsh here, who 
suggest key amendments to the 1989 Act. While they are 
written in the context of racially abusive language, they can 
be usefully broadened out to apply to hate speech and hate 
crime more generally:34
(1) There is a need for an offence of subjecting   
 another person to threatening, abusive or insulting 
 words about his race, with the result that the 
 person feels threatened or fearful for his safety or  
 for that of his companions or for his property; 35
(2) There is a need for an offence of incitement 
 to discriminate on the ground of race;
(3) There is a case for introducing an offence of
 active participation in (as distinct from passive 
 membership of) an organisation which promotes  
 or incites discrimination on the ground of race.36
Schweppe and Walsh also discuss the applicability of the 
1989 Act in the context of hate speech on the internet. They 
note that the requirement that an individual is incited to hate 
‘is no easy task to prove in the context of the World Wide 
Web.’ 37 They conclude:
‘While it could be argued that the 1989 Act can be used 
to combat racist material on the internet, in order to comply 
with best international practice and standards, it is 
recommended that Ireland sign and ratify the [Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic
nature committed through computer systems]...’ 38 
This would ensure that Ireland follows best international 
practice in this regard and would go some way to 
facilitating the prosecution of cyberhate. We would further 
suggest that the definition of ‘hatred’ in the Act be amended 
to include those characteristics protected under Equality 
legislation. While these amendments will not completely 
bridge the gap between expectation and reality identified by 
Taylor, we believe that they are urgently required to remedy 
the current failings in the legislation, given the inherent limi-
Introduction
Prior to examining our findings in relation to NGO 
experiences of hate crime and hate incidents, we will detail 
the current legal situation in Ireland in relation to hate crime, 
in order to determine if any issues highlighted represent fun-
damental failings in the legislation, or rather a failure in the 
processing and prosecution of hate crimes in this jurisdiction. 
Criminalising hate speech: the Prohibition 
of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989
The context and content of the Prohibition of Incitement to 
Hatred Act 1989 have been well documented and examined 
elsewhere 29 but we will highlight some aspects of it here for 
background purposes. A prohibition on hate speech is found 
in section 2 of the Act which makes it an offence for a person 
to publish or distribute material if that material is ‘threatening, 
abusive or insulting’ and is either intended to, or is likely to, 
stir up hatred. Section 1 of the Act defines hatred as being 
against a group of persons in the State or elsewhere on 
account of their ‘race, colour, nationality, religion, ethnic or 
national origins, membership of the travelling community or 
sexual orientation’ (sic).30
The primary criticism of the Act has been in relation to its 
effectiveness: only a small number of convictions have been 
secured under the Act, and as Taylor observes, there is what 
he calls ‘”an expectations gap” and “a frustration gap” 
between community aspirations for [the] legislation and 
the reality of its limited application and implementation to 
date’.31 This gap, he argues, potentially ‘undermines social 
cohesion, and a sense of the system working for all’.32
As Schweppe and Walsh note, however, the Act is unique 
in many ways:
‘In effect the Act is criminalising the expression of words or 
behaviour aimed at persuading others to have feelings or 
opinions which are lawful in themselves. To that extent they 
constitute a significant departure from the common law of
incitement and a more substantial intrusion by the criminal 
law into freedom of expression...’ 33
Schweppe and Walsh conclude that the Act strikes a very 
delicate balance between protecting freedom of expression 
while simultaneously criminalising the most extreme and 
dangerous forms of speech – that type of speech which 
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tations in the type of act targeted by the 1989 Act. 
However, any such amendments should not be considered 
as the only necessary legislative measure to combat hate 
crime.
Punishing hate crime: 
the current legal situation
Leaving aside the ‘expression offences’, internationally, 
there are two ways in which hate crime can be punished 
through the law. The first is by introducing new aggravated 
forms of existing offences, such as racially aggravated 
assault. Ireland does not currently have any such provisions 
in its legislation. The second key way in which hate crimes 
are punished internationally is through sentence 
enhancement. Here, legislation or judicial guidelines will 
require a sentencing court to enhance or aggravate the 
sentence where it is established by the prosecution that the 
crime was motivated by ‘hate’, or where ‘hate’ was 
demonstrated during the course of the commission of the 
offence. The sentencing system in Ireland is a discretionary 
one, with few limitations and even less guidance given to 
the Courts on sentencing issues.  Courts are fiercely 
protective of this discretion, and have traditionally been 
slow to impose any structure or guidance on sentencing 
practices on lower courts. That said, it does seem that the 
Court of Criminal Appeal is beginning to introduce 
sentencing guidelines. As O’Malley observes, in March 
2014, the Court of Criminal Appeal ‘took a major step 
forward by indicating the appropriate sentence ranges for 
the offences in question.’ 39 In three cases delivered on the 
same day12 the Court issued guidance on how such offences 
should be sentenced, and placed an obligation on the 
Director of Public Prosecutions in this regard:
In this Court’s view, there is now an obligation on the 
prosecution to draw to the attention of a sentencing judge 
any guidance, whether arising from an analysis carried out 
by this Court or from ISIS or otherwise, which touches on the 
ranges or bands of sentences which may be considered 
appropriate to any offence under consideration and the 
factors which are properly, at least in ordinary cases, to be 
taken into account ... In addition, it seems to this Court that 
it is incumbent on the prosecution to suggest, where such 
guidance is available, where the offence under 
consideration fits into the scheme of sentencing identified 
and why that is said to be the case. Finally, the prosecution
should indicate the extent to which it is accepted that factors 
urged in mitigation by the defence are appropriate and give 
at least a broad indication of the adjustment, if any, in the 
overall sentence which it is accepted ought to be considered 
appropriate in the light of such mitigation.41
Nonetheless, there are currently no guidelines in the 
context of hate motivated offences, and the Irish Sentencing 
Information System offers no advice as to how such offences 
have been sentenced in the past. 
Irish courts have yet to find that where an attack appears 
to have been motivated or aggravated by hate, that fact 
should be treated as an aggravating factor.  Indeed, they 
have explicitly stated that such a motivation is not one which 
must be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. 
That said, it remains at the discretion of each judge to 
determine the sentence of individual offenders, and 
generally speaking the motivation of the offender (possibly 
including a hate motivation) will be taken into account at 
this stage. The fact remains, however, that there is no 
obligation on the sentencing court to enhance a sentence 
due to a hate motivation, and  given the dearth of 
information regarding the day to day operation of the 
district court, it is impossible to determine how these offences 
are being dealt with currently.42  There are two cases worth 
noting in this regard which may indicate that, if previous 
sentencing practice is used to establish sentencing guidelines, 
the issue will remain unresolved.
In DPP v Jones and Derwin 43  the Director of Public 
Prosecutions appealed the sentencing court’s decision under 
section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 44  on the basis that 
it was unduly lenient.45  The first defendant was charged with 
the manslaughter of a 30 year old Chinese national. Prior to 
the incident which resulted in the victim receiving his injuries, 
a number of racial insults were exchanged between Derwin 
and two Chinese men, one of whom, Zhao Liu Tao, was the 
victim. The Court was asked to consider that the sentences 
were unduly lenient on the basis of the need to condemn 
racially motivated attacks or attacks in which race plays any 
part.  While the Court admitted that it did condemn such 
attacks, it went on to state that as the Director criticised only 
the ‘context’ in which the crime occurred (that is, the fact that 
it was racially aggravated), that context did not require a 
custodial sentence as a matter of principle, and further, that 
the sentence was ‘fully in accordance with the principles of 
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sentencing’.46  Thus, while Irish courts can choose to
aggravate a sentence based on the hate motivation of the 
offender, there is no requirement for them to do so. 
In DPP v O’Driscoll and Moore,47 the defendants were 
charged with assault causing harm, but also charged under 
section 2 of the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989. 
Here, the defendants made racist remarks towards the victim 
during the course of the assault and also after the assault in 
the presence of An Garda Síochána. They were convicted 
under section 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person 
Act 1997 for assault causing harm as well as under section 
2 of the 1989 Act. Here, the Court sentenced the defendants 
on the more serious count of assault, with the 1989 
prosecution being ‘taken into account’. Thus, while hate 
speech is criminalised in Ireland, the courts did not take the 
opportunity to declare the hate motivation an aggravating 
factor in sentencing, despite the clear evidence presented in 
the case that the offence was motivated by hate. That said, it 
does seem that where a ‘simple’ offence is combined with a 
prosecution under the 1989 Act, court will at least take the 
incitement offence into account, and may increase the sentence 
where they feel it is appropriate to do so.
The EU context
Alongside the current deficiencies in the current legal 
regime, Ireland’s membership of the European Union 
requires changes in our legal system. While the second of 
these does not directly relate to hate crime legislation, it is 
important to discuss in this context to determine the extent 
of our international obligations in this regard.
The 2008 EU Council Framework Decision on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by 
means of criminal law 48 requires member states to punish a 
range of ‘expression offences’49 and ancillary offences, but 
also to ‘take the necessary measures to ensure that racist 
and xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating 
circumstance, or, alternatively that such motivation may be 
taken into consideration by the courts in the determination 
of the penalties’.50 The deadline for transposition was 28 
November 2010, Ireland has yet to introduce legislation 
to ensure compliance with the Decision. However, as this 
is merely a framework decision rather than a Directive, this 
failure is not legally significant.
A second, more recent EU Directive establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims 
of crime51 sets out the protections which should be afforded 
to all victims. Article 22 of the Directive is significant in the 
context of hate crime. Article 22(1) states that, in assessing 
the needs of victims, an assessment must be carried out to 
determine if the victim has any particular ‘protection needs’ 
and the extent to which they would benefit from ‘special 
measures’ in the course of criminal proceedings ‘due to 
their particular vulnerability to secondary and repeat 
victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation.’ In this 
context, Article 22(2) states that the assessment should take 
the personal characteristics of the victim, the nature of the 
crime and the circumstances of the crime into account.
In addition, Article 22(3) states that particular attention 
should be paid to victims who ‘have suffered a crime 
committed with a bias or discriminatory motive, which could 
notably be related to their personal characteristics’. It goes 
on to note that, in this regard, victims of hate crime ‘shall be 
duly considered’. 
In the context of criminal investigations, the ‘particular 
attention’ to be paid to victims includes the following 
measures which the Directive states in Article 23(2) should 
be made available to victims:
(a)  Interviews with the victim should be carried out in  
 premises designed or adapted for that purpose;
(b) Interviews with the victim should be carried out   
 by or through professionals trained for that purpose;
(c)  All interviews with the victim should be conducted  
 by the same persons unless this is contrary to the  
 good administration of justice;
(d)  All interviews with victims of sexual violence, gender- 
 based violence or violence in close relationships, 
 unless conducted by a prosecutor or a judge, being  
 conducted by a person of the same sex as the victim, 
 if the victim so wishes, provided that the course of the  
 criminal proceedings will not be prejudiced.
15
A LIFE FREE FROM FEAR 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME IN IRELAND: 
AN NGO PERSPECTIVE
In the context of court proceedings, the Directive goes on to 
provide in Article 23(3) that the following measures should 
be made available to victims:
(a)  Measures to avoid visual contact between victims and  
 offenders including during the giving of evidence, by  
 appropriate means including the use of communication  
 technology;
(b)  Measures to ensure that the victim may be heard in the  
 courtroom without being present, in particular through  
 the use of appropriate communication technology;
(c)  Measures to avoid unnecessary questioning 
 concerning the victim’s private life not related to  
 the criminal offence; and
(d) Measures allowing a hearing to take place 
 without the presence of the public.
The requirements under Article 23(2) would seem reasonably 
straightforward to implement. However, the requirements 
under Article 23(3) may be more problematic, particularly 
those requiring the use of communications technology in the 
lower courts.
Further, the Directive does not limit the application of hate 
crimes to particular groups of victims: rather, once a crime 
is committed with a bias or discriminatory motive related 
to their personal characteristics the question of specific 
protection arises. Thus, limiting the scope of the protection 
offered by the Directive to a limited category of victims 
seems unfeasible. While the Directive does not require 
legislation to be introduced which imposes a harsher 
penalty on the offender, nonetheless, it does require that 
such victims be treated in a particularly protective manner 
by the criminal justice system as a whole in the context of 
the investigation and prosecution of a hate crime. Finally, 
the Directive comes with a time limit: EU Member States 
have to implement the provisions into their national laws 
by 16 November 2015. 
Do we need to criminalise hatred?
Not only is the 1989 Act in need of amendment, but a clear 
and strong statement needs to be made by the legislature 
ensuring that any crime which is committed out of a hate 
motivation is punished more severely. This ‘message’ aspect 
of hate crime legislation is well documented. As Perry 
observes:
‘... there may be some symbolic value to opting for 
legislation as a means of responding to ethnoviolence. 
Just as hate crime is an expressive act, so too is hate crime 
legislation. It sends a message to its intended audience(s) 
about what is not tolerated.’ 52
Walters also eloquently explains the various functions of 
hate crime legislation:
‘[H]ate crime legislation ... offers an important long-term 
role in shaping society’s evolving attitudes towards race, 
sexual orientation and other minority group characteristics. 
The punishment of hate crime offenders as ‘hate 
offenders’ offers important censure, providing a form 
of publicly expressed denunciation ofoffenders’ racist, 
anti-religious, homophobic, transphobic or disablist actions. 
Hence, a particularly compelling reason for criminalizing
‘hate crime’ is that it assists in shaping positive social mores 
by helping to create a social climate that rejects public 
displays of identity prejudice.’ 53
The creation of hate crime legislation also ensures that 
meaningful resources are allocated to criminal justice 
agencies who are now under a statutory obligation to 
address the issue. 
While it could be argued that it is sufficient that judges have 
discretion to enhance the sentence of an offender where 
hate is either shown to have motivated the offence, or have 
been demonstrated during the course of the offence, it is 
clear that the current legislative regime in Ireland gives 
members of our society what Perry describes as ‘permission 
to hate’.54
It is clear that the Irish legal system is largely 
incapable of punishing hate crimes adequately.
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In the Schweppe and Walsh Report from 2008, a number 
of key legislative changes were recommended, including 
amending the 1989 Act and the introduction of sentence 
enhancement provisions which would require courts to 
treat a hostile motivation as an aggravating factor in 
sentencing.55  However, the Irish Government in its recent 
periodic Report on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political rights indicated that even this minimalist approach 
would not be considered,56  as it would have ‘wider 
implications for the criminal law’, choosing to rely on the 
traditional discretion afforded to the judiciary in sentencing 
matters.57  
Further, issues which were identified by Burney and Rose 
and relied upon the 2008 Schweppe and Walsh Report 58 
such as the relatively low number of guilty pleas in the 
prosecution of aggravated offences in England and Wales 
have since been resolved,59  and we believe that it is time, 
not only to take these changes into account, but to go further 
and to introduce aggravated offences. 
Our recommendations will ensure that the Irish legislative 
position represents best international practice, as well as 
being evidenced-based. We would argue that hate crime 
legislation should be introduced in this jurisdiction for three 
main reasons:
1. Ireland is coming under increasing international  
 pressure to ensure that its laws are compliant  
 with European obligations in this regard. Further,  
 the legal position in Ireland in this area is 
 anomalous from an international perspective.
2. Victims of hate crime and those working on their  
 behalf have clearly indicated in this study and  
 others60 that hate incidents and hate crime are  
 a serious source of social and individual harm in  
 Ireland. 
3. The current response of the legal system is  
 haphazard at best, with the response of Gardaí,  
 prosecutors and courts dependent on the 
 individual actors involved in the case in the  
 absence of a clear policy statement. For example,  
 while the judiciary have discretion to impose  
 harsher penalties where they perceive a crime to 
 have been committed out of prejudice for the  
 victim, there is no requirement for them to do so.  
 Further, the manner in which hate crime and hate
 incidents are recorded by An Garda Síochána  
 is unsystematic, where only a minority of victim  
 groups are protected and the figures recorded  
 by its PULSE system are unrepresentative of 
 actual figures of hate incidents.61
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CHAPTER 4
NGO PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADEQUACY OF 
CURRENT LEGISLATION: SURVEY FINDINGS
People with intellectual disabilities were also identified as a 
target of hate crime.
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Profile of the respondents 
A total of 14 organisations, including some of the key 
advocacy NGOs in Ireland, participated in this research. 
The participating organisations advocate for people with 
disabilities; ethnic and racialised minorities, including the 
Traveller Community; immigrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers; religious minorities; the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Trans) communities; and prisoners.
All but one of the participating NGOs (which represents 
members of a religious minority) hold that hate crime is a 
specific issue of concern for the individuals and groups for 
whom they advocate. 
All 14 respondents stated that their 
organisation regards responding to hate crime 
as a priority area for action in Irish society.
The majority of NGO participants identified their clients’ 
experiences of to hate crime as being associated primarily 
with either racism against ethnic and racialised minorities, 
and migrants broadly, or homophobic and transphobic hate 
crime towards LGBT persons. 
‘Racist incidents are a daily occurrence for 
ethnic minorities including Travellers and
migrants.’ [ENAR Ireland].
‘We work to combat racism and hate crimes
as many of our clients would experience them’
[NASC].
‘Travellers have been subjected to hate speech
for many years. The growth in use of the
internet has resulted in hate speech becoming
an extremely serious issue’
[Irish Traveller Movement].
‘Hate crimes are an issue of concern for LGBT
people generally. The fear or apprehension
of hate crimes or other forms of abuse causes
members of the community to hide the
orientation or relationships in public’
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland].
‘Hate crimes against people with disabilities is
an issue throughout Europe and it should also
be a priority area for Irish society’
[Inclusion Ireland].
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As such, individuals who are targeted primarily because of 
their status as a person with a disability for example, may 
also experience hate crime because of their sexual orienta-
tion. Groups who are subjected to racist hate crime because 
they belong to racialised and ethnic minorities may also 
include individuals who are additionally targeted because 
they are members of a minority religion, or because of  
their gender identity. Across the 14 NGOs, all 9 grounds 
identified in Irish equality legislation – race, age, disability, 
civil status, religion, gender, sexual orientation, family status 
and membership of the Traveller Community – were 
mentioned as grounds on which clients experience hate 
crime. The most commonly cited grounds were race 
(identified by 8 NGOs), religion (7), sexual orientation (7), 
disability (5), gender (6) and membership of the Traveller 
Community (5). 
Significantly, research in Ireland and internationally clarifies 
that victimisation on multiple grounds is not just additive, 
in that each operates separately but in parallel; multiple 
grounds also intersect and interact, such that the manner 
in which racism manifests is shaped by one’s religious 
identity or the expression of homophobia is shaped by one’s 
gender.62  
While some groups evidenced a greater awareness of the 
broad multiplicity of grounds on which their members might 
be victimised, we argue that all groups can benefit from 
recognising the relevance of all 9 grounds to their clients, 
grounded in the heterogeneity of their 
constituent memberships.
At this juncture, it is important to note that some NGOs 
regarded the 9 grounds existent in Irish legislation to be 
non-exhaustive. Immigration status, politics and African 
identity were identified as further grounds on which people 
may be targeted, by each of three participating NGOs. 
Certainly, local and international research indicates that 
migrant status itself, regardless of racialised or ethnic 
identity is a target of hate and a particular source of vulner-
ability, given that the non-citizen status may make it more 
difficult for individuals to avail of the State’s protection.63 
In legislating against hate crime, Ireland may choose either 
to name the specific grounds for which the existence of 
hate crime is recognised or to provide for a more open an 
inclusive definition. The merits and shortcomings of each 
approach will be detailed in Chapter 5.
Manifestations of hate
Of the 13 NGOs who identified hate crime as 
an issue for the individuals and groups for 
whom they advocate, all but one identified 
their clients as experiencing hate crime, not 
just on one but on multiple grounds.
‘…our target groups experience multiple types
of discrimination on a regular basis’ [Sport
Against Racism Ireland].
The commonality and intersection of grounds 
on which people are targeted speaks to the 
existence of a shared basis for campaigning for 
stronger legislation among participating groups 
despite disparate core identities and interests.
The types of hate incident identified by NGOs 
include physical violence, sexual abuse and 
verbal abuse and harassment.
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‘…violence is a very particular concern for
transsexual and transgender people or for 
others who are non-gender conforming or 
perceived to be gay ...’ 
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland].
‘75% of the racist incidents reported to us in 
2011 involved racist violence and crime….’ 
[ENAR Ireland].
‘Very significant evidence of high levels of 
verbal, physical and sexual harassment and 
violence experienced by LGBT people related 
to their being LGBT. This happens at school, at 
work and in the public sphere … A key 
measure we use is whether a lesbian or gay 
couple would be and feel safe walking down 
the main street of any town in Ireland, hand in 
hand. And the answer is no in the vast majority 
of cases…’
[Gay and Lesbian Equality Network].
‘People with an intellectual disability are
particularly vulnerable to violence or the threat 
of violence. People in residential care are
particularly at risk.… In 2011, hospitals 
and community healthcare facilities recorded 
over 80,000 adverse events. Almost 10,000
 of these events involved incidents of violence, 
harassment, aggression or abuse against 
service users - including people with
intellectual disabilities.… Figures published by 
the Central Statistics Office indicates sexual 
offence involving ‘mentally impaired persons’ is 
now at the rate of one crime per fortnight and 
has almost doubled over the past year CSO, 
2012). Of the 184 survivors of sexual violence 
with disabilities who attended Rape Crisis 
Centres between 2008 and 2010, 47% had a 
learning disability (Rape Crisis Network, 2011). 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993 
does not adequately protect people with an 
intellectual disability from sexual abuse. The 
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989 
does not include disability as an aggravating 
factor. The exploration of violence against people.
with a disability as a hate crime should be
addressed.’ [Inclusion Ireland]
Hate speech, including online hate speech, was raised as 
a salient problem particularly for members of the Traveller 
Community. One organisation specifically identifies 
trafficking as a manifestation of hate:  
‘We feel that Trafficking is an issue that needs
to be addressed under hate crime on a number
of grounds including gender, ethnicity, status
etc’ [Integration and Support Unit].
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Two organisations made reference to institutional forms of 
discrimination. One NGO specifically cited: 
This also addresses itself to what might be called the 
strategic use of hate speech in the political arena, citing a 
need for greater accountability among public figures.
A third organisation references rights violations:
Advocates also mentioned incidents of individual 
discrimination, including members of the public avoiding 
taxis driven by those whom they perceive as non-Irish.
The impact of hate crime
In line with the discussion presented in chapter 2, the impact
of hate crime upon Ireland’s minority communities was
palpable in the responses provided to our queries.
‘…”pen and paper” hate towards Africans
from officials of various work arena. There are
official comments and discriminations directed
towards Africans. Employment discrimination.
… Most Irish media are hostile to Africans and
Africa. … The growing attitude of seeing as
[a] patriot a government official/party who
introduces a policy or makes a comment that
negatively affects non Irish living [in] Ireland
should be confronted by Irish themselves. …’
[Africa Centre Ireland].
‘Absolutely, we encounter violations of
Human and Civil Rights almost every day’
[Sport Against Racism Ireland].
‘Hate crimes have an extremely damaging 
effect on the … group that they are perpetrated
upon’ [Irish Traveller Movement].
That hate crime and the threat of hate crime 
violates individuals’ basic sense of safety and 
security was clear.
‘We must ensure that Ireland is a safe place
to live, for all. As long as hate crimes persist,
this will not be a reality’ [ENAR Ireland].
‘Members of the LGBT community frequently
complain that they do not feel safe on all
streets at different times of the day …’
[National LGBT Federation].
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For a number of the NGOs, this sense of security is
entwined with a fundamental right to live free from fear
and that it is only with the absence of fear that people can
experience freedom. 
The implications of hate crime are however, not just for the 
individual, but impact a whole community. NGOs participating 
in this study recognised the widespread effects of hate crime, 
not just on the targeted community, but on the wider society. The (in)adequacy of Irish hate crime legislation
It is notable that all 7 of the participating NGOs who 
have direct experience of supporting a client as they 
sought redress for a hate crime through the legal system,64 
regarded current Irish legislation as inadequate to the task 
of protecting their clients from hate crime. 
  
Another referred to the limitations of current legislation in 
relation to online hate speech: 
‘Everyone has the right, including people with 
an intellectual disability, to a life free from the 
fear of violence exploitation and or abuse’
[Inclusion Ireland].
‘The fear or apprehension of hate crimes or
other forms of abuse causes members of the 
community to hide the orientation or 
relationships in public. Many couples avoid 
any expression of affection in public and even 
on the streets of our capital city, the sight of 
a same-sex couple holding hands is rare.…’ 
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland].
‘If we do not address the issues at an early 
stage we will fall into the same difficulties 
experienced by other countries e.g. race related 
riots reported in the UK, Germany & France’ 
[Integration and Support Unit].
‘We have a responsibility as a nation, as a 
State and as a society to take the necessary 
actions to prevent and address hate crime. We 
must send the message that hate/racist crime 
shall not be tolerated. There is evidence from 
other countries and generations to show that in 
economic crisis, there is a risk of an increase in 
hate crimes. At this time then, it is particularly 
important that we are equipped to address 
such crimes’ [ENAR Ireland]
‘Creating an environment where LGBT people
can fully participate in all aspects of Irish
society is our goal, and a key element of this is
safe and secure participation in the public space
(as well as in private spaces - homes, schools,
workplaces). Creating a culture of respect for
diversity is key - it’s important for individuals,
for communities, for society and it’s critically
important for our economy’
[Gay and Lesbian Equality Network].
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The participating NGOs cited a variety of specific shortfalls 
in current Irish legislation, including incompleteness, 
prosecution rates and conviction rates. 
Five participating NGOs raised the issue of loopholes in 
current Irish legislation with regards to the most common 
grounds on which people may be targeted. Three NGOs 
[Immigrant Council of Ireland, ENAR Ireland and Doras 
Luimní] argued that Irish legislation does not give sufficient 
recognition to racist crime and should include racist hatred 
either as an aggravating factor in sentencing and/or by 
introducing aggravated offences. 
A further two NGOs held that Irish legislation does not offer 
any protection from hate crime based on gender identity or 
expression.  
A fifth noted that, in contrast to other jurisdictions, the 
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 does not 
include disability as an aggravating factor.
Not one of the 14 participating NGOs held that 
current Irish legislation provides the individuals 
or groups for whom they advocate with 
sufficient protection from hate crime and
12 made definitive statements to the 
contrary.
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‘ENAR Ireland is of the opinion that the Irish 
law does not sufficiently recognise racist crime 
in legislation. We have called on the 
Government to recognise racist crime in law 
and advocate for due consideration to be given 
to adopting a combined approach to 
addressing racist crime, including through 
aggravated sentencing and the introduction 
of aggravated offences. We also consider that 
there are substantial weaknesses in the 
Incitement to Hatred Act which need to be 
addressed. At a European level, we advocate 
for the effective transposition of the EU
Framework Decision on Racism and 
Xenophobia’ [ENAR Ireland].
‘As a result, the most vulnerable members of 
the LGBT community are not protected by law. 
For such legislation to be effective transgender,
transsexual and gender non-conforming people
must be included. The legislation should also
address the perception that a person has a 
given sexual orientation or gender identity’ 
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland].
‘In broad terms, the Incitement to Hatred Act is
inadequate. While it was critically important
at the time, 1989, to have sexual orientation
included - at a time when gay men were still
criminalised - it served and continues to serve 
as a symbolic Act only. It is not sufficient to 
address actual hate crimes targeting LGBT 
people’ [Gay and Lesbian Equality Network].
‘In the UK disability hate crime is regarded as 
an aggravating factor under the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.’ [Inclusion Ireland].
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Another referred to the limitations of current legislation in
relation to online hate speech:
A number of participating NGOs (Doras Luimní, LGBT  
Laywer’s Association, Irish Traveller Movement) cited  
shortfalls in the rates of prosecution and conviction of hate 
crimes under Irish legislation.
Recording and reporting of hate crime
Many of the participating organisations saw the adequacy 
of current systems of reporting and recording of hate crime as 
integral to the efficacy of Irish legislation in this area. Although 
this research did not specifically ask about recording and 
reporting, this issue was raised by eight of the twelve 
participating NGOs. The majority of these specifically 
mentioned a need for improved reporting. 
Support was expressed for an independent system of 
reporting and a number of the NGOs are themselves 
involved in providing such a service. 
Two of the NGOs specifically argued that the PULSE system 
used by An Garda Síochána to record crime contains some 
inadequacies. 
With further reference to the police service, one NGO 
specifically addressed the level of trust between the Gardaí and 
marginalised communities as an issue which impacts reporting:
Inadequate to tackling hate crime, especially
online hate crimes [NASC].
‘… the legislation has rarely if ever been used.
I am aware of only two prosecutions for racial
abuse and none for hate crimes based on 
sexual orientation...’
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland].
Individual NGOs expressed concern regarding 
both low rates of reporting and also regarding 
the current system of reporting.
‘We know that racism and discrimination are
significant problems in Ireland but many
incidents of racism are not reported. ENAR
Ireland has found that only one in six people
report racist incidents to the Gardaí. It is
important to report racism so that the 
authorities understand the extent of the 
problem and begin to take it more seriously’ 
[Doras Luimní]
‘…although the Garda pulse system makes
provision for the recording of homophobic
crime it appears that this marker is used only
infrequently. There is no provision for the
recording of transphobic crimes…Many LGBT
people have simply come to accept harassment
and violence as being just something that
happens to them in their daily lives rather than
as crimes which should be reported...’
[LGBT Lawyers’ Association of Ireland]
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While a number of NGOs mentioned working with the 
Gardaí towards addressing hate crime, one argued that 
individual members of An Garda Síochána may, in some 
cases, be part of the problem, rather than part of the 
solution.  
‘… although there is a Garda LGBT group
(G-Force) it is known even through recent 
research conducted in Dublin City University 
that many Gardaí are not out in their place 
of work. This in turn contributes to a climate 
wherein LGBT people are reluctant to report 
crimes against them. This is unsurprising in the 
context of older member of the community who 
can recall life prior to decriminalization, which 
occurred only as recently as 1993…In other 
jurisdictions including some regions of England 
and Wales, the [police] have taken measures as 
simple as placing pride stickers at visible points 
in the station indicating that LGBT victims of 
crime will be treated in asupportive 
environment.’ [LGBT Lawyers’ Association of 
Ireland].
These comments are borne out by research conducted in
Ireland that further demonstrates inconsistent policing
practice towards members of minority communities.
Experiences of explicit racism or ethnic profiling at the
hands of the state deter those who experience hate crime
from making an official report.67 Thus, many hate crimes go 
unreported. Faced with inadequate state action to 
counter racism, a collective of NGOs have developed a 
third party reporting mechanism (discussed further below) as 
a resource that victims and witnesses of racism can utilise to 
report racist incidents.6 A similar mechanism has also been
initiated in the context of transphobic hate crime by the
Transgender Equality Network Ireland (TENI).68
NGO responses to hate crime
In the absence of what they would regard as an adequate
official response to hate crime in Ireland, a number of the
participating NGOs have become actively involved in
addressing hate crime at a societal and/or individual level,
in their own right.
A number of the participating organisations, who
advocate for the rights of migrants and/or whose activities
are primarily focused on anti-racism, are actively involved
in a co-ordinated campaign for the introduction of racially
aggravated offences and sentencing.
‘Gardaí are understaffed and undertrained
in these areas, our experience (through client
reports) is that they are reluctant to get 
involved or to follow up complaints. In a small 
number of incidents it was alleged that Gardaí 
themselves were actually racist towards them. 
Clients felt that Gardaí had stereotypes of 
certain groupings without foundation’
[Integration and Support Unit].
‘We have developed strong relationships with
the Gardaí over many years which has led to
the development of Garda Liaison Officers to 
the LGBT community and other measures to 
provide direct support to LGBT people who 
experience hate crime (and other crimes). Our 
work tacklinghate crimes is also incorporated 
into our work in Education - making schools 
safe and supportive for young LGBT people. 
Further we engage politically on measures to 
address hate crime, including exploring 
legislative responses’.
[Gay and Lesbian Equality Network]
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Other NGOs have also adopted a lobbying approach, but
to advocate for policy change.
Many of the NGOs actively encourage the reporting of
hate incidents among their clientele. Again, those who are
involved in anti-racism work and who advocate for migrants
have, in some cases, embarked upon an awareness raising
role by directly engaging in the recording of racist incidents
as an alternative to reporting directly to the police service.
‘We have launched a petition, where people 
can call on Government to recognise racist 
crime in law … having the legislative frame-
work to address and prevent hate crime is key. 
We have also noticed a shift in reception to our 
arguments and are hopeful that things may 
change in the near enough future. That said, 
this issue has been examined for over a decade 
by NGOs and other stakeholders without any-
successful outcome’.
[ENAR Ireland]
‘We have prepared a position paper on
implementation of the National Disability
Strategy. In this paper we identify violence
against people with intellectual disabilities and
inadequacy of certain legislation. We have
recommended that exploration of violence 
against people with a disability as a hate 
crime should be addressed as part of the 
implementation plan for the National Disability 
Strategy’. [Inclusion Ireland]
Across Ireland, a diverse range of NGOs currently
participate in a co-ordinated civil society initiative to gather
data on racist incidents.69 The development of and 
widespread participation in such civil society initiatives is 
both an indicator of dissatisfaction with the official system 
of monitoring and a belief that independent monitoring is 
preferable.
‘We have set up a system for the independent
monitoring of racist incidents. …’.
 [ENAR Ireland]
‘We know that racism and discrimination are
significant problems in Ireland but many
incidents of racism are not reported. ENAR I
reland has found that only one in six people
report racist incidents to the Gardaí. It is
important to report racism so that the 
authorities understand the extent of the 
problem and begin to take it more seriously. …’ 
[Doras Luimní]
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Conclusion
The NGOs participating is this study demonstrate an 
awareness of, and proactive engagement with, the issue of 
hate crime in Ireland. However, some are more limited than 
others as regards the resources they can bring to bear on 
the problem. This situation is magnified by the fact that, 
while a minority of organisations engaged in anti-racism 
work are acting in a co-ordinated fashion to bring about 
practical and legislative changes in this area, most NGOs 
participating in this study are acting independently. Given 
that our participants evidence a great deal of commonality as 
regards the perception of shortfalls in current hate crime 
legislation, as well as related reporting and recording 
mechanisms, there is a case for a collaborative approach 
to pursuing shared interests.
‘We are also conscious of the need for us all to
work in solidarity, where possible. We also 
need to work collectively’. [ENAR Ireland]
61 
James Carr, ‘Regulating Islamophobia: The Need for Collecting Disaggregated Data  
 on Racism in Ireland’ (2011) 31(4) Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 574; 
 The Integration Centre, Recording Racism in Ireland (Integration Centre 2011) 
 Available at http://www.integrationcentre.ie/getattachment/d70f7539-ce06-403d-98 
 d7-da21f7d46426/Recording-Racism-in-Ireland.aspx.  
62 
See for example Scott Poynting and Greg Noble, Living with Racism: The experience  
 and Reporting by Arab and Muslim Australians of discrimination, abuse and violence  
 since 11 September (Report to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission  
 2004) 
63 
Bryan Fanning, Brian Killoran, Saorlaith Ní Bhroin and Geoff McEvoy, Taking 
 Racism Seriously: Migrants’ Experiences of Violence, Harassment and Anti-Social 
 Behaviour in the Dublin Area (Immigrant Council of Ireland 2010) Available at http:// 
 www.immigrantcouncil.ie/research-publications/2010/499-taking-racism-seriously- 
 migrants-experiences-of-violence-harassment-and-anti-social-behaviour-in-the-dublin-area
64 
A further two respondents were unsure if their organisation had such experience. 
65 
In response to the question “Do you consider that current Irish legislation provides the  
 individuals and/or groups for whom you advocate with sufficient protection from hate  
 crime?” two NGOs responded ‘Unsure’ and 12 responded ‘No’.
66 
James Carr and Amanda Haynes, ‘A Clash of Racializations: The Policing of Race  
 and of Anti-Muslim Racism in Ireland’ Critical Sociology, published online 5 July 2013  
 Available at http://crs.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/07/05/08969205134 
 92805.abstract; See also Bryan Fanning, Brian Killoran, Saorlaith Ní Bhroin and Geoff  
 McEvoy, Taking Racism Seriously: Migrants’ Experiences of Violence, Harassment and  
 Anti-Social Behaviour in the Dublin Area (Immigrant Council of Ireland 2010) Available  
 at http://www.immigrantcouncil.ie/research-publications/2010/499-taking-racism- 
 seriously-migrants-experiences-of-violence-harassment-and-anti-social-behaviour-in-the- 
 dublin-area
67 
Irish Network Against Racism (2013) iReport [online] available at 
 http://enarireland.org/iReport/ 
68 
Transgender Equality Network Ireland Stad [online] available at https://transequality. 
 wufoo.eu/forms/stad-2014/ The first Report detailing the findings of this mechanism  
 will be published after the completion of our Report, however, initial findings indicate  
 that in 2013, there were 32 Reports made to TENI, of which 15 were classified as hate  
 crimes. See, http://teni.ie/page.aspx?contentid=771   
69 
Irish Network Against Racism (2013) iReport [online] available at http://enarireland. 
 org/iReport/ A similar mechanism has also been initiated in the context of transphobic  
 hate crime by the Transgender Equality Network Ireland available at https://
 transequality.wufoo.eu/forms/stad-2014/ 
29
CHAPTER 5 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME
A LIFE FREE FROM FEAR 
LEGISLATING FOR HATE CRIME IN IRELAND: 
AN NGO PERSPECTIVE
30
Introduction
It is clear that NGOs working in Ireland perceive the current 
legal situation as inadequate on a number of grounds. From 
an international perspective, there are a number of legislative 
options Ireland could adopt. Before we can decide what form 
any legislation which criminalises hate should take, we need 
to ask a fundamental question: what do we want the legisla-
tion to achieve? There are a number of things that it can do. 
There are also a number of things it cannot do. 
In the criminal law, you are either guilty or you are not guilty. 
Because of this, the law needs to be very precise in what it 
requires an individual to do before that individual can be 
found to be guilty. Being convicted of a criminal offence is 
a very serious matter: currently, it will stay on your record 
for life, and you may need to disclose it when you are 
applying for a job or moving to, or even visiting, another 
country. Being convicted of a hate crime carries with it even 
more stigma. For these and other reasons,70 when we decide 
that a particular act should be a criminal offence, we need 
to be very clear exactly what it is that we want to crimina-
lise, we need to be sure that the criminal law is capable of 
criminalising it, and we need to be very precise as to the 
language we use when framing the offence. The punishment 
of motivation is not something the criminal law is particularly 
used to dealing with, and any legislation which allows for this 
must be clear and precise. 
Before we decide what approach is most appropriate in 
this jurisdiction, we might ask first, what we expect of the 
legislation. 
Essentially, we need to decide what type of act should be 
covered by the law, and whether that act is suitable to be 
deemed a criminal offence before we decide how the 
legislation should be framed. 
Analysis
Chapter 3 introduced the understanding that there are a 
number of ways in which hate can be criminalised. The first 
main option is to introduce aggravated versions of existing 
offences, such as assault, criminal damage and public order 
offences. This option has two further sub-options: first, to only 
criminalise the offender where it is proven that they were 
motivated by hate and second, to criminalise the offender in 
a broader category of circumstances, where hatred is 
demonstrated during the course of the offence.71
The second main option is to introduce a piece of legislation 
that allows for the crime to be prosecuted as normal, but 
where a hate motivation or demonstrated hatred is proven 
to have occurred, there will be a requirement on the court 
to aggravate, or increase, the sentence imposed on the 
offender.72
We will discuss these options in turn, along with other issues 
which need to be addressed in the legislation.
Option 1: Aggravated offences 
When considering introducing aggravated versions of 
offences which are known to the criminal law, two quite 
different legislative options are in place in Canada, on the 
one hand, and England and Wales on the other. We use 
these two divergent examples as a means of highlighting 
potential legislative reform in this jurisdiction. The Canadian 
legislation is quite limited, requiring that the offence be 
Do we wish to punish only those offenders who
are truly motivated by prejudice, or should the 
legislation also punish those individuals who 
may not have committed the crime from a bias 
motivation, but who, during the course of the 
offence demonstrate hostility to the victim by 
usingoffensive speech. What type of speech 
do we class as a hate crime, and what do we 
consider a hate incident?
In examining the legislative options, we look 
at Northern Ireland, England and Wales and 
Canada for comparative purposes. The legal 
system in these jurisdictions is similar to that in 
Ireland, and their experiences in legislating for 
hate crime are relevant in our context.
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motivated by hostility.73 Statute law in England and Wales is 
broader, requiring harsher punishment where the offence is 
motivated, or partly motivated, by hostility, or where hostility 
is demonstrated to the victim during the course of the offence. 
We will examine each of these options in turn, showing how 
the legislation has been implemented in these jurisdictions, 
and highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of each.
1A: Motivated by hostility
Section 718.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code provides 
that when sentencing, a court should consider a number of 
factors, and aggravate or mitigate the sentence accordingly. 
The first of these factors is relevant here: it provides that 
‘evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice 
or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, 
colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual 
orientation, or any other similar factor’ should be taken into 
account in sentencing.74 Importantly, this is not an aggravated 
offence, but it is relevant to our discussion as it restricts the 
operation of the sentence enhancement to only those offences 
which the sentencing court believes are motivated by bias, 
prejudice or hate. 
What is significant to note here is that, in Canada, words 
spoken by the offender will not necessarily amount to proof 
of motive. In their admirably thorough analysis of case law 
applying section 718.2(a)(i), Lawrence and Verdun-Jones 
note that while evidence of motive can be sometimes difficult 
to establish, the courts will infer motive in certain contexts:75
 Circumstances of the offence
  Act itself is of a hateful manner (eg public incitement of hatred)
  Date of the offence
  Location of the offence
 Circumstances of the offender
  Words spoken by the offender
  Items in offender’s possession
  Conduct of offender
  Group in which offender is a member
 Circumstances of the victim
  Group in which victim is a member
  Activities of the victim
The extent to which words spoken by the offender can lead 
to an inference of a hate motive in Canada is important to 
understand here. As Lawrence and Verdun-Jones observe:
‘The courts have generally declined to apply s. 718.2(a)(i) on 
the basis of [slurs spoken, or other disparaging remarks made 
during or after the commission of the offence.]...Whether the
words spoken by an accused are uttered during or after the 
commission of the criminal act, the courts must take care to 
ensure that these words are indeed referable to motive and 
are not mere expressions of belief.’ 76
It is this latter distinction which is key: the mere holding or 
expression of bigoted beliefs is not sufficient to prove 
motive. In R v Lelas,77 referring to the common law 
position, the court stated that offenders cannot be sentenced 
for repugnant beliefs: ‘[t]he charge is mischief, not the 
promotion of hatred, and save where the beliefs of the 
respondent serve to explain his actions, I do not propose to 
take them into account.’ 78 These common law principles were 
applied in the context of section 718.2(a)(i) in R v Wright 79 
where the Court stated:
‘In order for s. 718.2(a)(i) to be invoked, there must be proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was motivated 
by one of the listed factors. The objective of that sub-section is 
to impose increased penalties on those who offend because 
of their beliefs, but not to impose such penalties for merely 
holding those beliefs.’ 80
Lawrence and Verdun-Jones refer to one case where words led 
to an inference of motive. Here, the accused was an Aborigi-
nal youth who attacked a Caucasian male. During the course 
of the attack, he and others acting with him stated, ‘Native 
Syndicate does not fuck around’ and ‘This is what happens to 
white boys who come into the ’hood’’. As stated in the case, 
here the words used served to explain the criminal act, and 
thus section 718.2(a)(i) was applicable. Where offensive 
words are used in the course of the criminal act, which do not 
explain the reason why the offender committed the act, but are 
simply offensive because of their content, there will be no way 
in which motivation can be inferred, and the sentence will not 
be aggravated under the section.
The Canadian position is thus clear: while 
words can lead to an inference of motivation, 
there needs to be a causal link between words 
and actions, and the mere holding of or 
expression of bigoted beliefs is not sufficient to 
prove motive. 
32
Option for reform
Hate crime legislation can restrict the application of the 
hate crime label to only those individuals who we can prove 
attacked the victim because of their bias towards the victim 
– that is, where the commission of the basic offence was 
motivated, or partly motivated, by bias. This is the approach 
favoured in Canada (though, again, only in the context of 
sentence enhancements), and it is certainly more difficult to 
prosecute and convict an individual under this legislation as it 
is hard to prove what ‘motivated’ an individual to commit 
a crime. In the same way that it is difficult to convict an indi-
vidual under the 1989 Act, it may be similarly difficult 
to convict under this model. 
However, while it may be more difficult to prosecute under 
this model, it could also be argued that this is a good thing: 
it is only those who are motivated by hate that should be 
considered ‘hate criminals’ and these people should be 
marked out from the rest of society. Legislation could be 
framed in such a way as to indicate the circumstances in 
which a ‘hate motivation’ could be inferred, using perhaps 
the Canadian experience as a guide. The circumstances in 
which a hate motivation will be inferred in the Canadian 
courts could also usefully be applied in an Irish context.
1B: Demonstration of or motivated by hostility
This second option is the approach that is taken in 
legislation which applies in England and Wales.81 Section 28 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides that an offence 
is racially aggravated if either: 
 (1) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately  
  before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates 
  towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the  
  victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a  
  racial group; or
 (2) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility  
 towards members of a racial group based on their 
 membership of that group.
As Gadd and Dixon point out, the most immediate problem 
which faced the courts in England and Wales was the 
distinction between demonstrated hostility and hostile 
motivation, the two limbs of the offences under section 
28(1).82  We will concentrate on the type of case that 
constitutes ‘demonstrated’ hostility, for comparative purposes. 
DPP v Woods 83 was a prosecutor’s appeal by way of case 
stated. The respondent was convicted of racially aggravated 
assault under section 29 of the 1998 Act.  His friend was 
refused entry to a public house by the victim, and proceeded 
to assault the victim by punching him to the head.  It was 
found as a matter of fact that he had used the words ‘you 
black bastard’ during the course of the altercation.84 As to the 
motivation of the offender, the conclusions of the justices as 
set out in the case stated are important:
‘We found the Respondent’s hostility to be borne out of his 
frustration and annoyance as a result of his companion 
being denied entry to the premises, and whilst he may have 
intended to cause offence by the words, this was not
‘hostility based on the victim’s membership (or presumed 
membership) of a racial group’. We believed that the 
Respondent’s frame of mind was such that he would have 
abused any person standing in [the victim’s] shoes by
eference to an obvious physical characteristic
had that individual happened to possess one.’ 85
On the question as to whether any other motive could 
disengage the racial one, the appeal Court stated that the 
section
‘… is designed to extend to cases which may have a racially 
neutral gravamen but in the course of which there is 
demonstrated towards the victim hostility based on the victim’s
membership of a racial group. Any contrary construction 
would emasculate section 28(1)(a).’
The fact that the judge found that the defendant would have 
abused anyone by reference to an obvious physical charac-
ter—and just happened to do so on the basis of the victim’s 
skin colour—was the next, and perhaps most important issue 
discussed by the Court.  On this, the court stated:
While in Canada, the legislation is restricted to 
those offences where the base offence was 
motivated by bias, prejudice or hate, in England 
and Wales, mere demonstration of hostility
towards the victim is sufficient to elevate the 
base offence to a racially aggravated one.
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‘If the respondent would have assaulted another person and 
called him, say, ‘a fat bastard’, that would not be an 
aggravated offence because Parliament has not found it 
necessary to provide additional protection to the overweight 
by the creation of an aggravated form of the offence
by reference to that characteristic.’ 
The fact was, the Court held, that the type of abuse used in 
this context was in fact racial abuse, and thus the case fell 
to be considered under the 1998 Act. While there was no 
evidence that the offender was motivated by hostility, the fact 
that he used abusive language of a racial nature during the 
course of the offence led to a conviction under the Act.
The case of DPP v Green86 examines further the relevance of 
motive in the context of prosecutions under the Act. When 
Green was arrested, she uttered a string of racially abusive 
language towards her arresting officers, making reference to 
their Pakistani heritage and skin colour.87 However, Green’s 
best friend was black - and gave evidence that she felt the 
respondent had no racist tendencies - and Green herself had 
children of mixed ethnic origin. 
In the Magistrates Court, it was concluded that, due to the 
fact that the offender referred to the white skin colour of one 
of the arresting officers, and the respondent displayed the 
same kind of hostility towards the two police officers, the 
abuse was a ‘continuation to her opposition to arrest’ rather 
than a deliberate act of racial hostility.88 Rafferty J on appeal 
declined to agree with this position. She stated that it is quite 
true that an offender may have any number of motivations 
which lead to hostilities, but ‘that cannot diminish or under-
mine what is contemplated and expressed as “the additional 
wrong” of demonstrated racial hostility.’89 Thus, even though 
there was no evidence that the defendant here was racist, or 
that her act was motivated by hostility, she was found guilty. 
A recent case on this issue is R v H(S).90 The respondent 
approached a Nigerian employee of his local job centre, and 
verbally abused him. During the course of this verbal abuse, 
he referred to the employee as a ‘monkey’91 and a ‘black 
monkey’.92 The judge withdrew the count of section 31 racial 
hostility from the jury. The reason for this was, as he stated, 
that the prosecution had no possibility of persuading the jury 
‘that he said what he said was as a result of hostility towards 
the man because of his race as opposed to personal dislike 
or loss of temper or both’ 93 or because of ‘hostility towards 
that individual rather than dislike or a desire to humiliate or 
insult.’94 The reason given by the Court for this opinion was 
that the incident was ‘short lived’ and for this reason, the jury 
‘could not safely exclude the possibility that temper and/or 
personal dislike were the motivation for the use of such words 
if, indeed, they were uttered.’95 
On appeal, counsel made clear that the case concerned 
section 28(1)(a) hostility, and not section 28(1)(b) hostility. 
Leveson L J notes that the same mistake was made by the trial 
judge in this case as had been made in M - that is, that the 
court slipped from demonstrated hostility to motivated 
hostility.96 Leveson L J found that the terms used by the 
respondent could not but generate a prima facie case of an 
‘outward manifestation of racial hostility.’97 The question as 
to when vulgar abuse becomes racial hostility is one which 
should be left to the jury. In the present case, the Court found 
that there was indeed material on which the jury ‘could 
properly conclude that [the] circumstances went beyond 
vulgar abuse into an outward manifestation of racial 
hostility.’98
Option for reform 
From this analysis of the case law, it seems that in England 
and Wales, the use of racially abusive language in the course 
of the commission of a criminal offence can elevate a normal 
offence to a racially aggravated one, almost regardless of 
the intention or motivation of the offender when using that 
language. The result of this is that it seems easier to secure a 
conviction under this legislation than it is to attain a sentence 
enhancement under the Canadian legislation. Which 
approach is appropriate to this jurisdiction is open for 
discussion.
The benefits to this approach are that it is relatively easy to 
prove that hostile language was used, and there is no need to 
investigate whether the offence was motivated by hostility or 
bigotry. 
So the question is, if because someone uses
hurtful language while they are committing an 
offence, does that mean that they should be 
convicted of a hate crime, labelled a racist and 
be punished more harshly?
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If we think back to why we punish hate, it is because 
the offender has targeted an individual, not because of 
opportunity, but because of who they are perceived to be. 
If we punish an individual who commits a crime 
opportunistically but uses hateful speech, is that consistent 
with the underlying philosophy of the criminal law? 
A response to this argument might be that, no matter what 
the motivation of the offender, where the victim feels that 
they were the victim of a hate crime, and the community 
is in fear because of that, the motivation of the offender is 
irrelevant. But, as we have noted earlier, the criminal law 
does not, and can not, take the feelings of the victim into 
account when deciding what crime, if any, will be 
prosecuted. 
From the perspective of the criminal law, before we can 
convict someone of a criminal offence, we have to show 
that they have a ‘guilty mind’, or the mens rea for that 
offence. It is not clear in the context of demonstrated 
hostility what the ‘intention’ is: is it to simply say the words 
regardless of their implications, or is it to demonstrate 
hostility? It might be considered an element of the actus reus 
(guilty act) of the offence: that the words spoken are part 
of the act in question. Similar issues arise here, however. 
Schweppe and Walsh highlight this problem in the context 
of the expression offences:
‘It is not acceptable to hold someone criminally liable for a 
serious offence unless they have a‘guilty mind’ with respect 
to the prohibited conduct ... Much of the complexity [in the 
1989 Act] stems from the need to include statutory defences 
to sift out those who did not realise that they were peddling 
hate or that their actions would have that effect. It is difficult 
to see how this complexity can be avoided without exposing 
to criminal liability persons who did not know and had no 
reason to suspect that their words or actions were peddling 
race hate. Criminalising persons in such circumstances
would create constitutional difficulties in this jurisdiction and 
would offend against the common law principle that the 
criminal act should not be punished unless it was done
with a criminal mind (mens rea).’ 99
However, these views are not unanimously held. Walters 
argues:
‘Whether in practice an offender can demonstrate racial 
hostility without any conscious awareness as to its racist 
nature is, on the face of it, far from convincing … Indeed in 
most cases the fact that a racial slur has been expressed will 
create an inference that the offender is aware that such
language, especially when used in a hostile context, will be 
perceived by others as being racist.’ 100
While it could be said that ‘demonstrated hostility’ approach 
has been used to great effect in England and Wales in 
criminalising hate, it could also be argued that the manner 
in which the legislation is used is overly broad. It is certainly 
easier to prosecute and convict someone of a hate crime 
there than in Canada, but is the legislation in England 
and Wales really targeting those who are motivated to 
commit crimes out of hatred, or those who simply use 
offensive speech during the course of a criminal act? 
We need to decide in this jurisdiction exactly what we want 
to punish. If we wish to have legislation which punishes 
anyone who uses hate speech during the course of a criminal 
act, though that speech may not be related to the act itself, 
then we use the demonstrated hostility model. 
1C: Range of offences covered
If we agree that aggravated offences should be introduced 
into the criminal law, the next question is what range of of-
fences should be so aggravated. As noted by Schweppe and 
Walsh, a whole range of criminal offences have been record-
ed as being committed with a race hate motivation, including 
‘discharging a firearm, sexual assault and drunkenness.’101 
Further, the type of crime committed against the various victim 
groups varies enormously. For example, the Law Commission 
of England and Wales observes that in the context of 
disability hate crime, crimes of sexual offences, burglary, 
robbery and fraud and forgery are significant,102 which are 
not as statistically notable in the context of homophobic and 
transphobic hate crime103 or racial and religious hate crime.104 
However, across all categories, three particular principal of-
fences are carried out against victims more than others: 
offences against the person); criminal damage; and public 
order offences. Our survey shows that key offences 
perpetrated against community members in Ireland are 
physical violence, sexual abuse, verbal abuse and 
harassment.  
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Option for reform 
As the Law Commission observes, however, if this approach 
is taken, ‘in relation to disability, a significant proportion of 
wrongdoing (at least 38.2%) would be untouched.’105 If this 
approach is taken, however, those wrongs committed against 
these particular victim groups could be dealt with separately 
in relevant legislation, by amending existing legislation such 
as the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 to ensure 
that disabled individuals are appropriately protected. Any 
legislation can then be examined after a number of years to 
ensure that it is adequately protecting victims of hate crime.
Option 2: Sentence enhancement
To aggravate a sentence because of the motivation of the 
offender is not something which is terribly new to the criminal 
law: when sentencing any offender, the court will always take 
aggravating and mitigating factors into account. These can 
include such mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea; 
cooperation with the investigating authorities; or evidence 
of remorse. Aggravating factors can include factors such as 
there being a weapon involved during the course of the 
offence; whether the offence was premeditated; or whether 
the offence was committed while the offender was released 
on bail. Again, legislation could provide that the sentence 
should be enhanced where a hate motive is proven, or 
where hatred is demonstrated during the course of the 
offence, and the legislation will be interpreted accordingly. 
The sentence enhancement model is used in both Canada, 
as detailed above, and in Northern Ireland. Again, however, 
there are two distinct options available: first, to restrict the
 operation of sentence enhancements to only those crimes 
which are motivated by hostility; or second, to allow those 
instances in which hostility is demonstrated to result in a 
sentence enhancement. In one sense, this approach is more 
consistent with the general principles of the criminal law: the 
motivation of the offender is only taken into account during 
the sentencing stage of the offence. Its major drawback is 
the fact that the clear message associated with aggravated 
offences is not present.
Article 2 of the Criminal Justice (No 2) (Northern Ireland) 
Order 2004 provides that where an offence was aggravated 
by hostility, the court must treat that as an aggravating factor 
in sentencing which increases the seriousness of the offence, 
and must state in open court that that is the case.106 Here the 
legislation takes the England and Wales approach, using 
both demonstrated hostility and motivated hostility. It provides 
that the offence is aggravated by hostility if: 
 ... at the time of committing the offence, or immediately  
 after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the  
 victim of the offence hostility based on: 
  (i) The victim’s membership107
   (or presumed108 membership) of a racial group;109
  (ii) The victim’s membership (or presumed membership)  
   of a religious group;110
  (iii) The victim’s membership (or presumed membership)  
   of a sexual orientation group; 111
  (iv) A disability 112 or presumed disability of the victim.113
There are two main options for reform. The first 
is to replicate an aggravated offence for all 
basic offences in the criminal code. The second 
is to legislate for those offences which are most 
commonly committed against the majority
of victim groups: assault, harassment, criminal 
damage and public order offences.
The second major legislative option is to 
introduce legislationwhich provides for a 
sentence enhancement where it is established 
that the original crime was motivated by
hostility, prejudice, bias or hatred, or where 
such hostility was demonstrated during the 
course of the offence. 
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The legislation goes on to provide that if ‘the offence is 
motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility’ towards any of the 
above, the offence will also be one aggravated by hostility.  
Article 2(4) goes on to provide that it is immaterial whether 
the hostility is based to any extent on any other factor.114
It would appear that since the legislation was introduced, 
there have only been 13 occasions when the prosecutor has 
brought the legislation to the attention of the court, and from 
those, only one occasion in which the Judge imposed an 
enhanced sentence.115  
Option for reform
This approach is certainly more consistent with the criminal 
law, which usually only concerns itself with the motivation of 
an offender at sentencing stage. If this approach were taken, 
courts could be required to at least consider the hostile 
motivation of the offender, or the fact that hostility was 
demonstrated during the course of the offence to the offender, 
during the sentencing stage. Further, whilst these offenders 
will be punished more severely for demonstrating hatred 
during the course of committing the offence, they will not be 
labelled a ‘hate criminal’ and the criminal law will not treat 
them as such.
However, this approach may be perceived to have two key 
weaknesses. First, unless legislation requires it, there may 
be no obligation on the court to increase the sentence of 
the offender due to the circumstances in which the offence 
took place. Second, for an array of reasons (as set out in the 
Northern Ireland study116) prosecutors may be reluctant to 
bring this additional element of the offence to the attention 
of the court, or introduce it during the course of the 
prosecution, and there will be no obligation on them to do 
so. Finally, the ‘message’ element of hate crime legislation 
may be lost: without a clear legislative statement that hate 
motivated offences are to be treated more harshly we may 
be diluting the message that they are unacceptable.
Who are the victims?
As we have seen, depending on the jurisdiction, the groups 
protected by hate crime legislation vary enormously. Across 
the United Kingdom, generally the protected categories are 
race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and transgender 
status. If we examine hate crime legislation across a broader 
category of jurisdictions, it is clear that the range of victims of 
hate crime is much greater. 
Garland and Chakraborti117 note that across the OSCE 
(Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and 
the EU, the most commonly named grounds are ethnicity, 
nationality, race, religion and sexual orientation (the latter 
less comprehensively). Disability and transgender status are 
frequently omitted from protection.
So how do we decide which categories of victims should be 
included in hate crime legislation in this country? There are a 
few ways that we could do this. The first is to replicate those 
groups which exist in legislation applying in the United 
Kingdom. 
A second approach would be to simply use the same catego-
ries as currently exist in the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred 
Act 1989. However, this also has shortfalls as it would not 
protect the trans community, amongst others.  
In the United States, Frederick Lawrence tried to resolve this 
issue. He proposed a two-stage process.119 The first question 
A list of protected classes across a wide range 
of hate crime legislation in the United States
includes: age; citizenship; class; colour; 
disability; economic status; ethnicity; family 
responsibility; gender; matriculation;
membership of labour organisation; marital 
status; national origin; personal appearance; 
political orientation or affiliation; race; religion; 
sex; sexual orientation; and social status.
One immediate problem with this is that one 
of the most marginalised minorities in Irish 
society, the Traveller Community, would not 
automatically be included. Further, The Law 
Commission of England and Wales has 
observed that the current limitations on 
victim categories may be unacceptable in that 
jurisdiction.118 
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asks whether victims self-identify as members of an identity 
group. The second stage, then requires the legislature to 
determine which of these self-identifying groups should be 
included in the bias crimes statute. The groups identified in 
this manner, he states, ‘are the characteristics that implicate 
social fissure lines, divisions that run deep in the social 
history of a culture.’120 In the context of the United States, for 
example, he highlights race and racial discrimination: ‘the 
greatest American dilemma has its roots in slavery, the 
greatest American tragedy.’121  He further observes that ‘race, 
color, ethnicity, religion and national origin’ are all examples 
of such national social fissure lines.122 While this approach 
has merits, it lacks a normative, or objective, basis, and 
allows politicians to discriminate, for valid or less meritorious 
reasons, between victim groups. It also potentially requires 
politicians to be purely reactive in their approach to hate 
crime legislation, without the capacity to proactively protect 
new vulnerable groups.
That said, the approach does have some merit: in Ireland, 
there are groups which we can immediately identify as, 
historically, being targets of abuse and discrimination. 
Such groups would include members of the Traveller 
Community, single mothers, people who do not associate 
with the dominant faith (i.e., Catholicism), and members of 
the LGB community. More recently, we might include the 
categories of race123, national origin, trans people and ethnic 
origin. The authors would regard this list as still incomplete 
however. 
This reflects Perry’s statement that the definition of crime itself 
is relative, and historically and culturally contingent – what is 
considered a hate crime today could be ‘standard operating 
procedure’ in another time or place.124
Further, the process can often be reactive rather than 
proactive. This problem is best explained by reference to the 
Sophie Lancaster case in England. Sophie was a Goth, who 
was murdered in an attack on her and her boyfriend. The 
trial judge in her murder case believed she and her boyfriend 
were targeted ‘solely because their appearance was 
different’ and labelled the murder a hate crime.125 Sophie and 
her boyfriend, Robert Maltby (who survived the attack) had 
been targets of abuse before the fatal attack and it was quite 
clear that the perpetrators of the offence were motivated by 
prejudice against the Goth community when attacking their 
victims.126 Garland notes that the trial judge stated, ‘[T]his 
was a hate crime against these completely harmless people 
targeted because their appearance was different to yours.’127 
The problem of course, is that ‘Goths’ or ‘music fans’ or even 
the more generic category of ‘appearance’ are not protected 
in UK hate crime legislation, and so the attackers were not 
convicted of a hate crime. 
That said, there are also arguments against being 
over-inclusive in terms of those characteristics which are 
protected. Taylor, for example, argues that women (that is, 
presumably, an element of the gender characteristic) should 
not be included as a protected characteristic for a number of 
reasons. While acknowledging that violence against women 
is a serious issue, both involving ‘very serious forms of 
targeted violence’ and having a basis ‘in unequal power 
relationships and a direct relationship to pervasive sexism’, 
he goes on to argue that rather than being a minority group, 
women are in fact in the majority. Further, he observes that 
there are very few jurisdictions which protect women in this 
manner in hate crime legislation.
We would argue, however, that where an individual is target-
ed solely because of their gender, including gender variance, 
there is no justification in law for excluding them from the 
protection of hate crime legislation.128 While women can be 
characterised as a minority as a consequence of their 
historical disadvantage relative to men, it is not necessary 
that the targeted group be a minority, or, for only minority 
groups to be protected by legislation: Chakraborti129 observes 
that if we accept this position, it would mean that members 
of majority groups could not be protected, no matter how 
persuasive the evidence that an attack was based on 
prejudice or hate.130 
Moreover, any list would, arguably, become 
outdated over time. 
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Rather than limiting those groups to be protected under 
legislation, an alternative presented by Garland and 
Chakraborti131 is that of ‘using an individual rather than a 
group-based human rights approach’, which would be 
inclusive of all victims of hate crime. They propose that the 
offence is framed by reference to ‘targeted victimisation’ 
rather than specific groups or grounds, such that any 
individual who is victimised as a result of their identity is 
protected.132 They note that such an approach would prevent 
the exclusion from legal protection of minority groups whose 
stigmatised status may be less widely recognised as a result 
of lesser political capital, such as the homeless. Equally, 
when framed in this manner, they argue that legislation would 
be less static and therefore less subject to outdating. Finally, 
this framing would allow for the protection of members of 
dominant social groups under hate crime legislation, although 
the desirability of such a provision is debated in literature 
where hate crimes are understood as constituent of relations 
of power which maintain the dominant position of some 
groups in society and the subordinate position of others.134 
They highlight in particular, the potential offered by the 
ODHIR’s (Office for Democratic and Human Rights of the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) 
definition of hate crime, which describes it as ‘pre-conceived 
negative opinions, intolerance or hatred directed at a 
particular group [which] must share a common characteristic 
that is immutable or fundamental, such as 65 race, ethnicity, 
language, religion, nationality, sexual orientation.’135 
This approach certainly has merits, and 
Option for reform 
A viable alternative to setting out a rather arbitrarily selected 
category of protected groups, as is the case in England and 
Wales, is that the jury (or judge) should be able to determine 
whether a bias crime was committed against the victim on the 
basis of a ‘defining characteristic’ or ‘personal characteristic’, 
as in the ODHIR’s definition of hate crime. This approach 
would allow courts broad discretion in determining whether 
a bias crime occurred in a particular instance, thus allowing 
crimes against groups which are not protected by legislation, 
such as the homeless and Goths be addressed by the 
legislation. If the true purpose of a bias crime statute is to 
seek to deter crimes which are motivated by bias against a 
group, then this approach has much merit. 
We have observed during the course of our research that 
hate crimes are committed against a wide category of groups 
in Ireland, and particularly highlight the fact that those groups 
protected by Equality legislation are not only discriminated 
against according to the terms of that Act, but also that hate 
crimes are committed against them. In Ireland, equality 
legislation deals with discrimination on nine grounds: 
 Gender
 Civil status (i.e., marital status or civil partnership status)
 Family status
 Age
 Race
 Religion
 Disability
 Sexual orientation
 Membership of the Traveller community.136
By focusing on the motivation of the offender 
in attacking the victim, we believe that it is 
possible to ensure that all potential victims are 
protected by legislation without expanding the 
scope of the legislation in a manner
which proves to be unwieldy.
our recommendations go some way to ensuring 
that an inclusive, rather than exclusive
approach is taken in the legislation.
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As in the ODHIR’s definition of hate crime, legislation could 
be developed in such a way as to protect those characteris-
tics included in equality legislation as indicative character-
istics, or presumptive characteristics, but allow the jury or 
trier of fact to include other characteristics where it deems it 
appropriate, including an ‘other similar factor’ element. 
Using this approach, 
without being hamstrung by a politicised and narrow 
hierarchy of named victims.137 
If this jurisdiction is to adopt the approach of naming those 
victim groups which are to be included in legislation, this 
process will require careful consideration given its association 
with the creation of a hierarchy of victims. The Prohibition 
of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 should also be amended 
such that both statutes are framed in a similar manner in this 
regard. 
In some cases, individuals may be targeted because they 
are misidentified as a member of a particular group. For this 
reason, 
Cybercrime
Our research shows that the use of hate speech on the 
internet is an important issue for those individuals supported 
by the NGOs that took part in our survey. While it can be 
argued that the 1989 Act is sufficiently broad for the purposes 
of covering hate speech on the internet, Schweppe and 
Walsh note that, it is next to impossible to show that anyone 
was ‘incited’ to hate on the basis of opinions published on the 
internet. Their suggested amendment to the Act to allow for a 
prosecution where an individual feels threatened or fearful for 
his safety or for that of his companions or property might go 
some way to dealing with this issue. They further note:
‘While it could be argued that the 1989 Act can be used to 
combat racist material on the internet, in order to comply with 
best international practice and standards, it is recommended 
that Ireland sign and ratify the [Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through 
computer systems] and introduce measures to eliminate the
dissemination of threats which are of a racist or xenophobic 
nature.’ 139
Given the complexity of this issue, as well as the international 
context, of combating hate speech online, we adopt this 
recommendation. 
Option for reform
The manner in which the Additional Protocol is transposed 
into Irish legislation is open to discussion. Daly presents two 
options: first, that the obligations expressed in the Additional 
Protocol could be fulfilled by adapting the relevant provisions 
of the UK Malicious Communications Act 1988; or second, 
that the 1989 Act be amended to prohibit the ‘intentional 
publication, through a computer system, of material which 
advocates, promotes or incites violence (and in limited 
cases, discrimination)’ against protected groups.140 He does, 
however, recognise, as we do, that the protection offered by 
the Additional Protocol is limited, being as there are, ‘safe 
havens to host and carry content deemed to be illegal by the 
Additional Protocol’.141
 
the legislation would include all nine protected
categories in the Equality Act, but include ‘any 
other similar factor’ as a tenth protected 
category. This approach provides an objective 
element to the legislation, allowing the judge
or jury to determine whether, after considering 
all aspects of the case, a hate crime was in fact 
committed,
the perception by the offender that the victim 
has a particular characteristic, as well as the 
actual presence of such a characteristic should 
be included in the legislation.138
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Ancillary requirements
While introducing legislation to criminalise hatred sends a 
very strong message to society that hate crime will not be 
tolerated, and ensures that the most serious of offenders are 
prosecuted and convicted, nonetheless we firmly and strongly 
believe that we cannot introduce this legislation in a vacuum. 
We believe that to effectively combat hatred in society, public 
education and civil society initiatives should be introduced as 
policy measures. Not all hate incidents will be criminalised, 
yet as we have highlighted throughout this Report, non-crime 
incidents have significant repercussions for victims, 
communities and society. For this reason too we believe 
that there are a series of other requirements which must be 
introduced or developed in tandem with legislation to allow 
for hate speech and hate crime to be effectively dealt with in 
Ireland.142
 
While it is not within the remit of this Report to discuss the full 
range of public and civil society initiatives which may serve to 
counter hate crime, we discuss some of those non-legislative 
ancillary measures which may bolster the effectiveness of the 
justice system’s response to hate crime below.   
Policing
Schweppe and Walsh observed in 2008 that while members 
of An Garda Síochána were reasonably well aware of the 
provisions of the 1989 Act, they are unaware of the levels of 
proof required to secure a conviction, believing that once a 
1989 prosecution is not possible the hate motivation cannot 
be presented in court. Further, ordinary members are not 
aware of the definition of hate incidents used by the 
organisation, nor how to use it.143 Writing in 2011, Taylor 
further observes that, from a community perspective, Gardaí 
are still not seen to respond seriously to reported racist 
incidents which has two main effects: first, minority ethnic 
communities feel that their experiences of racist incidents are 
not being offered appropriate seriousness by the Gardaí; and 
second, this has led to a perceived wider lack of confidence 
in the Gardaí – a concern that for comparable offences, 
minority ethnic suspects are generally treated more harshly, 
more likely to be charged and receive stiffer penalties.144 
Research conducted on anti-Muslim racism in Ireland has 
demonstrated that members of minority communities may be 
reluctant to report to members of An Garda Síochána on the 
basis of previous interactions.145 Informed by negative 
experiences, instead of reporting a crime to the Gardaí, 
participants took it upon themselves to manage their 
experience or enlist the aid of an NGO.146
The above section foregrounds the related issues of clarity and 
consistency, and moreover, the role of training in improving 
Garda performance when interfacing with those who have 
experienced hate crime. In terms of clarity, international 
research demonstrates the importance of police officers being 
able to recognise hate offences and the diverse bases upon 
which persons may be targeted for such activity.165 It is 
vital that members of An Garda Síochána have a clear 
understanding of what constitutes a hate offence, how it is 
defined and the various groupings protected by the 
legislation. This understanding, provided through effective 
training could offset the current uncertainty demonstrated by 
members of the service when engaging with victims of hate 
crime or hate incidents, and prosecuting hate offences. It is 
vital that effective and consistent policies and procedures are 
followed by members of the Gardaí when interfacing with 
members of minority communities and their concerns, 
especially if trust is to be built and hate crime in its 
multifarious forms is to be challenged.166
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Recording and reporting
If hate crime is to be addressed effectively, either through 
legislative or non-legislative means, accurate, comprehensive 
and timely data is essential. In an Irish context, the official 
recording of hate crime is fundamentally hampered by the 
lack of effective legislation, which impacts on the impetus of 
individual Gardaí to record hate motivations where these will 
not impact on prosecution or sentencing.147 This may be one 
factor in the disparity between official figures on recorded 
racism in Ireland and those published by NGOs.148 Perry 
asserts, across Europe, ‘…disparities in police training in the 
identification of hate crime, and the frequent resistance to 
recognize the phenomenon…’149 also directly impact on the 
recording of hate crime. This in part can be overcome by the 
manner in which police have to record a hate crime/incident. 
Although not unproblematic, it is mandatory for police in 
Sweden, regardless of the crime, to indicate on their crime 
recording system whether or not the event had a hate 
motivation.150 The model deployed to record racist incidents 
in the UK also places a requirement on officers to record ‘all 
Reports of incidents, whether from victims, witnesses or third 
parties...crime related or not, [which] will result in the 
registration of an incident Report by the police’.151 The ability 
to record non-crime incidents is particularly important in terms 
of the data it can provide. 
In Ireland, no such mandatory mechanism is in place in An 
Garda Síochána resulting in inconsistencies in the recording 
of hate crime. While An Garda Síochána can capture some 
hate incidents, it does so in the narrative of the report only 
and thus is unwieldy in terms of producing data in the form of 
rates of occurrence.152 Recently published research 
demonstrates a lack of awareness, and by implication, 
training, of how a hate crime/incident is to be recorded on 
the PULSE system. Indeed ‘many [Gardaí] do not understand 
that it is the responsibility of the Gardaí to record the number 
of racist incidents that occur’.153 
Writing in 2010, Perry notes that ‘… the evidence suggests 
that few EU nations have succeeded in developing effective 
strategies for gathering the necessary data – indeed, some 
have not made a concerted effort to do so.’ 85 Ireland fares 
poorly when compared to other EU Member States when it 
comes to being able to systematically identify, and record 
diverse forms of hate crime. Ireland is ranked among those 
having ‘limited data...few incidents and a narrow range of 
bias motivations are recorded. The Netherlands, Sweden, 
Finland and the UK form the four States classed as having 
‘comprehensive data’. At a minimum, all of these States 
capture and publish data on hate crime under the categories 
of ‘racism/xenophobia’; ‘Anti-Semitism’; ‘Sexual 
Orientation’; ‘Religious Intolerance’; ‘Islamophobia’; 
‘Disability’; and ‘Gender Identity’.155  
There is dialectical relationship between recording and 
reporting, such that developments in one impact the other. 
Certainly, improved recording, where it contributes to more 
effective responses on the part of the state, will encourage 
reporting, as indeed may the heightened awareness which 
informs efforts to improve recording. Conversely, the belief 
that one’s experience will not be taken seriously, recorded or 
acted upon discourages reporting:156
‘I called them immediately…the community
Garda rang four days [later] and within the
time they were supposed to come down to me.
I spoke to a community Gard and she said to
me, ‘For God’s sake do you not get on with
anyone down there?’…That’s what I was told…
so that was in 2009 and the last time I let my
children out to play…. ‘157
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In some cases the act of reporting itself may be a source of 
(anticipated and actual) further victimisation where the victim 
fears the police because of negative experiences with the 
police force in question or other police forces in the past. 
In an Irish context, some victims of anti-Muslim racism have 
described prior encounters wherein individual members of 
the police showed the same prejudices which motivated the 
original offence.158 More generally, research conducted by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights159 found that 
almost 60 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans in Ireland had 
been subjected to police stop and search procedures in 
the preceding 12 months. 
As well as the bureaucratic and legislative supports required 
for effective recording, training which instils an ethos of 
professionalism and sensitivity in encounters with members of 
marginalised groups is necessary. Policing practices which 
perpetuate criminal profiling on the basis of identity group 
membership, it is argued, are likely to undermine any 
achievements in this area. 
Alongside legislative change, reporting and recording 
mechanisms should be adapted to reflect the new statutory 
position. The importance of recording hate incidents should 
be reflected in the new recording system, and the connection 
between hate incidents and hate crimes recognised. 
Alternatives to retributive justice
Finally, it is worth noting Perry’s assertion that, at least with 
regard to individual offenders, imprisonment and generally 
harsher sentences are unlikely to achieve reform.160 
‘While they may not be appropriate to all manner of 
offences, a discussion of the potential of education, mediation 
and restorative justice approaches is warranted.’ 160
For victims of hate crime, the decision to report 
requires an act of faith – that reporting will
prove worthwhile and that the experience of 
reporting itself will not exacerbate the harm 
already caused to them.
The Law Commission of England and Wales observe that 
‘improved education and an end to offensive and 
discriminatory media representation’ might well address the 
nature and scale of disability hate crime more effectively than 
criminal legislation.162  
It is important to remember that the criminal 
law is just a single tool that can be used to 
combat hate crime in society, and as the 
bluntest tool, should be used as a measure of 
last resort.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Introduction 
This Report was initiated because of the authors’ conviction 
that the time is ripe for the introduction of a new statute 
which brings our criminal code in line with best international 
practice in respect of hate crime. It is our conviction that 
consultation regarding the formulation of this Act should be 
widespread. In particular, we have sought to highlight and 
include the perspectives of NGOs who currently, and in the 
absence of adequate legislative protection, constitute the 
front line against hate incidents.
The core aim of this Report is to contribute to progressing 
the discussion and to provide an impetus for legislative 
change. As such, we have presented the reader with a 
range of legislative options drawing upon international 
experiences as well as analysis of the Irish legal context. 
We reiterate the importance of research and consultation 
to ensuring that legislative change is informed by actual 
community needs, rather than perceived needs. Having 
benefitted from NGO perspectives on hate crime it Ireland, 
it behoves us to contribute to the debate we propose by 
presenting our conclusions as to the most appropriate 
direction for legislative change.
Proposal for reform
We propose that legislation be introduced as a matter of 
urgency. The Act should create four new hostility based 
offences: assault aggravated by hostility; harassment 
aggravated by hostility; criminal damage aggravated by 
hostility; and public order aggravated by hostility.164 The 
‘aggravated’ element of the offences should be defined as 
occurring where the offence is believed by the trier of fact 
to be wholly or partly motivated by hostility, prejudice, bias 
or hatred towards the victim on the basis of their personal 
characteristics or their perceived characteristics’ at the end 
of this sentence. Importantly, these offences will be limited to 
those crimes which are motivated by hostility. In the context 
of sexual offences against disabled individuals, the Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 should be appropriately 
amended.
Alongside these offences, a sentence enhancement 
provision should be introduced, whereby the Act should 
provide that where the court believes that any offence was 
wholly or partly motivated by hostility, prejudice bias or 
hatred, or where hostility, prejudice, bias or hatred were 
demonstrated during the course of the offence, it shall treat 
that as an aggravating factor in sentencing. For this 
element, the demonstrated hostility element is included. 
Additionally, legislation should provide that where a 
prosecution is taken which includes a prosecution under 
section 2 of the 1989 Act, the sentence imposed under 
the 1989 Act must be served consecutively to the sentence 
imposed for the primary offence. 
The protected categories, or ‘personal characteristics’ 
should be defined in the legislation as ‘Gender, Civil status, 
Family status, Age, Race, Religion, Disability, Sexual 
orientation, Membership of the Traveller Community or any 
other similar factor.’
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The Act should also include amendments to the 1989 Act as 
set out in this Report including:
 (1) Introducing an offence of subjecting another person  
  to threatening, abusive or insulting words about his  
  or her personal characteristics or perceived 
  characteristics, with the result that the person feels  
  threatened or fearful for his safety or for that of his  
  companions or for his property;
 (2) Introducing an offence of incitement to discriminate  
  on the ground of an individual’s personal 
  characteristics or perceived characteristics;
 (3) Introducing an offence of active participation in 
  (as distinct from passive membership of) an 
  organisation which promotes or incites discrimination  
  on the ground of her personal characteristics.
 (4)  Ireland should sign and ratify the Additional Protocol  
  to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the  
  criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic  
  nature committed through computer systems.
  
 (5) The definition of ‘hatred’ in the Act should be  
 amended to include those characteristics or perceived  
 characteristics protected under Equality legislation, along  
 with the ‘other similar factor’ category.’
We conclude finally, by looking to the future and our hope 
that this Report will contribute to the gathering impetus for 
better protection of the dignity, security and safety of all of 
those vulnerable to and victimized by hate crime in Ireland:
‘To the extent that difference is socially constructed, it can 
also be reconstructed. In other words, as a society, we can 
redefine the ways in which difference ‘matters’. We can 
strive for a just and democratic society in which the full 
spectrum of diversity addressed here is re-evaluated in a 
positive and celebratory light.’ 163
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These offences should mirror the existing principal offences as exist in current 
 legislation.
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